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I. INTRODUCTION
Twins Amanda and Elyse were born to William and Marian-
tonia Kolacy of New Jersey on November 3, 1996.1 At this ordinarily
joyous occasion, only Mariantonia was able to welcome the two girls
into the world; their father, William, had passed away some eight-
een months before their birth-nearly a year before the girls were
conceived.
2
When William and Mariantonia were a young married cou-
ple, doctors diagnosed William with leukemia and advised him to
begin chemotherapy immediately. 3 Fearing the treatment or the
disease would render him sterile, William preserved some of his
sperm for later use.4 Regrettably, William did not survive the dis-
ease and died on April 15, 1995, at the young age of twenty-six.
5
Nearly a year later, on April 3, 1996, Mariantonia underwent an in
vitro fertilization procedure in which William's sperm was united
with her eggs, and the resulting embryos were implanted into her
uterus.6 Some seven months later, on November 3, 1996, Amanda
and Elyse were born 7 into the world and into a legal conundrum:
despite being William's undisputed genetic offspring, whether they
had a right to be legally recognized as his children faced great un-
certainty.8
This uncertainty surfaced when the Social Security Admini-
stration denied Mariantonia's petition to obtain dependent benefits







8. See id. at 1259.
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for Amanda and Elyse based on William's Social Security contribu-
tions during his life.9 The Administration denied the petition be-
cause the girls did not qualify as dependents under the Social Secu-
rity Act, 10 which, in part, provides that benefits "can be paid to a
child who could inherit under the State's intestate laws."'1 Under
New Jersey law, children born after the father's death can inherit
only if "conceived before his death."'12 Since Amanda and Elyse were
conceived almost a year after William died, a strict reading of the
statute would leave them unable to claim heirship and, conse-
quently, they would be denied the Social Security benefits to which
dependents are normally entitled.13 In further pursuit of the chil-
dren's claim for dependent benefits, Mariantonia sought to have
Amanda and Elyse declared "among the class of persons who are
S. .. intestate heirs"'14 of William under New Jersey law. Searching
in vain for guidance, the court was unable to find any "American
appellate court decisions dealing with [the] central issue" of the le-
gal status of children conceived posthumously. 15 Despite this void,
the court reasoned that the children were nonetheless "entitled to
have their status as heirs of their father determined for a variety of
state law purposes,"'" and accordingly, recognized Amanda and
Elyse as the legal heirs of William.'
7
The Kolacy case exemplifies an important legal problem cre-
ated by advances in technology. In the past, conception was possible
only through sexual intercourse, thus death represented the ulti-
mate finality.'8 Today, new reproductive technologies have made
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (quoting § 216 of the Social Security Act). Under the Social Security Act, a child can
also qualify for survivor's benefits by showing an actual or a statutory presumptive dependence
on the deceased wage-earning parent, which posthumous children cannot do because they were
not alive during the parent's life, and thus, could not have been dependent on the parent. For a
comprehensive discussion of Social Security benefits and posthumous children, see generally
Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security Survi-
vor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251 (1999).
12. Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1260 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West 2001)).
13. See id. at 1259-60.
14. Id. at 1259.
15. Id. at 1260. Since the Kolacy case, however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts became the first court of last appeal in the country to decide this issue. See infra Part II.C.
16. See Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1260; see also infra Part II.B.2.b (dicussing Kolacy).
17. For more discussion of the Kolacy case, see infra Part II.B.2.b.
18. See Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procrea-
tion, 75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 902 (1997) ("Throughout human history, death has always signified an
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noncoital reproduction commonplace and have even made it possi-
ble to conceive from the grave. 19 Posthumous conception-the appli-
cation of reproductive technology to conceive a child after the death
of one or both of the genetic parents-would certainly have seemed
oxymoronic only a short time ago. 20 Today, however, it is a real
matter that creates doubt about the legal status of this unique class
of children.
21
To date, the Kolacy case is one of only three reported cases
involving actual posthumous children. 22 Yet, while the legal status
of posthumous children is a seemingly exceptional concern, it will
not remain so. By some estimates, roughly 2.3 million couples in
the United States seek some form of treatment for infertility prob-
lems every year.23 At least 40,000 of these couples use some type of
assisted reproductive technology.24 Viewed in the context of repro-
ductive technology's historical growth, the situation becomes imme-
diately more striking. By 1980, some 250,000 babies had been con-
ceived by artificial insemination. 25 Less than ten years later, in
1987, more than 172,000 women had used artificial insemination,
resulting in the birth of about 65,000 babies in that year alone. 26
The 1995 National Survey of Family Growth revealed that two per-
cent of the nearly sixty million women of reproductive age in the
United States, approximately 1.2 million women, had had an infer-
awesome finality. The conclusive demise of the body necessarily led to the concomitant extin-
guishing of the procreative process.").
19. Id. at 902-03.
20. Banks, supra note 11, at 256 ("The uncertainty of the rights and status of this newly
created class of children is a direct consequence of the advancements in medical technology that
have made tremendous inroads in assisted reproduction in the last ten years. These inroads have
plagued the legal community with a myriad of novel issues and controversies that, before this
time, could never have been contemplated by lawmaking bodies.")
21. This Note will refer to children conceived after the death of one or both of the genetic
parents as "posthumous children." This term should not be confused with the common law usage,
which refers to the situation where a father dies after conception but before the child's birth,
which would not require the use of an assisted reproductive technology. See infra Part II.A.1.
22. Hart v. Chater and Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257
(Mass. 2002), are the other two cases concerning the legal status of posthumous children. For
further discussion of Hart, see Banks, supra note 11, at 251-56; Gibbons, infra note 25, at 193-94;
Garside, infra note 29, at 720-22; Kerekes, infra note 29, at 232-40; Shah, infra note 48, at 561-
62; and infra, Part II.B.2.a. For further discussion of Woodward, see infra Part II.B.2.c.
23. Banks, supra note 11, at 268.
24. Id.
25. John A. Gibbons, Who's Your Daddy?: A Constitutional Analysis of Post-Mortem Insemi-
nation, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 187, 187 (1997).
26. Id.
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tility-related medical appointment in the previous year.27 An addi-
tional thirteen percent had received infertility treatments at some
time in their lives.28
Just as reproductive technologies have become common op-
tions to overcome infertility, posthumous conception will naturally
grow as well.29 The stage is already set as directors of sperm banks
27. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., 1998 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND
FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 3 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drlart.htm.
28. Id.
29. Several forms of assisted reproductive technology in combination with a process known
as cryogenic preservation can be used in posthumous conception. These common forms include
artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote intrafallopian
transfer, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection.
Cryopreservation is a freezing process used to preserve gametes and even fertilized embryos
for later use. The gametes or embryos are placed in tanks of liquid nitrogen at very low tempera-
tures, as low as negative 328 degrees Fahrenheit, which creates the possibility that they can be
used several years after their initial preservation. Indeed, healthy children have been conceived
from sperm that was frozen and stored for more than ten years. Accordingly, cryogenically pre-
served reproductive material can be used many years after the death of the provider, resulting in
a posthumous child who is unequivocally the genetic offspring of a person long passed away.
Banks, supra note 11, at 270; Sheri Gilbert, Note, Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of
Postmortem Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 525-26 (1993).
Artificial insemination ("AI") is the most well-known and most widely used form of assisted
reproductive technology, with literally hundreds of thousands of such procedures conducted in
the United States alone. It involves a syringe being used to insert sperm into the woman's vagina
or uterus during her ovulation. It is also perhaps the simplest method, typified by the fact that
women have been known to use a simple "turkey baster" to inseminate themselves. Ellen J.
Garside, Posthumous Progeny: A Proposed Resolution to the Dilemma of the Posthumously Con-
ceived Child, 41 LOY. L. REV. 713, 715 (1996); Michelle L. Brenwald & Kay Redeker, Note, A
Primer on Posthumous Conception and Related Issues of Assisted Reproduction, 38 WASHBURN
L.J. 599, 606, 612 (1999).
Another, more sophisticated, form of artificial insemination is intrauterine insemination, in
which sperm is inserted directly into the uterus with the use of a catheter, which bypasses the
cervix and vagina. Robert J. Kerekes, My Child... But Not My Heir: Technology, the Law, and
Post-Mortem Conception, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213, 217 (1996).
In vitro fertilization ("IVIY') consists of extracting eggs from the woman and fertilizing them
outside her body in a lab. Once this process is completed, the fertilized ova are inserted into the
woman's uterus through her cervix, where they will develop according to the natural process and
rate of pregnancy. This process gave rise to the so-called "test tube baby" and has become an
increasingly popular method of assisted reproduction. Id. at 216; Garside, supra, at 714.
Gamete intrafallopian transfer ("GIFT') is a procedure that also requires removing eggs from
the woman's ovaries. Once extracted, the eggs are combined with sperm, and then the mixture is
inserted into the woman's fallopian tubes using a fiberoptic instrument known as a laparoscope.
Once inserted, the sperm and eggs will have a chance to develop naturally in the fallopian tubes,
which, in some cases, offers a greater chance of success. Any resulting embryo would then move
into the uterus and develop as in a normal pregnancy. Garside, supra, at 715; Kerekes, supra, at
216-17; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Reproductive Health Information Source,
at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/art96/apdx.htm.
Zygote intrafallopian transfer ("ZIFT") is a technique in which eggs are extracted from the
woman and fertilized outside her body. Then, like GIFT, the resulting zygote is inserted into the
woman's fallopian tubes with a laparoscope. Garside, supra, at 715; Kerekes, supra, at 217.
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report that widows of cancer victims often request their husbands'
preserved sperm "in the hopes of having a child by their husband."30
Sperm banks have also reported increased donation activity during
military conflict 3' by soldiers attempting to preserve their ability to
become fathers. 32 Many additional reasons could motivate people to
preserve their gametes for possible use in posthumous conception:
the threat of sterility caused by chemotherapy or other treatments;
the desire of persons undergoing sterilization procedures to pre-
serve their ability to become parents; and the same desire among
those anticipating suicide. 33 Whatever the reason, the groundwork
certainly exists for increasingly common use of assisted reproduc-
tive technologies in the posthumous conception context.
34
Yet, while posthumous conception will certainly become
more prevalent, longstanding common law and statutory presump-
tions that are used to determine paternity fail to take into account
the phenomenon of posthumous children. Furthermore, few states
have enacted legislation that specifically addresses the status of
children born posthumously. 35 The states that have addressed this
issue have denied posthumous children the possibility of establish-
ing a legal relationship with their deceased parent.3 6 Without this
legal recognition of parenthood, posthumous children cannot inherit
by intestate succession from their deceased parent or receive survi-
vor's benefits, such as from insurance or social security. Moreover,
because these children are not considered the legal children of the
deceased parent, they cannot inherit through intestate succession
from the deceased parent's own parents or siblings-the children's
grandparents, aunts, and uncles. Intestate inheritance rights are
granted automatically to legitimate children, and illegitimate chil-
Intracytoplasmic sperm injection ("ICSI") is a form of reproductive technology often used
when dealing with male infertility problems. This procedure involves injecting a single sperm
into an egg that has been previously extracted from the would-be mother. The fertilized egg is
then placed into the woman's uterus. Banks, supra note 11, at 271; Kerekes, supra, at 217.
30. Gilbert, supra note 29, at 523.
31. Id. at 525-26 (noting increased donation by soldiers during the Vietnam War and more
recently during the Persian Gulf conflict).
32. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 190. Even the Apollo astronauts had the opportunity to pre-
serve their sperm in case space travel harmed their reproductive capacity. Gilbert, supra note 29,
at 525.
33. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 190.
34. See Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Reproductive
Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 55, 96 (1994) (noting
congressional survey reporting that some men preserve sperm specifically out of a desire to pro-
create after death and that many sperm banks would honor such donors' wishes).
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part II.A.3.
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dren can obtain such rights if they properly filiate with their non-
marital parent.
37
As posthumous conception becomes more prevalent, current
statutory schemes will increasingly prove inadequate, and the law
will need to take into account this new class of children properly.
This Note proposes a general framework for resolving the legal is-
sues raised by posthumous children. 38 This Note argues that, at a
foundational level, any determination of the rights of posthumous
children should be grounded in three important constitutional doc-
trines: (1) the constitutional status of the family, which protects
childrearing decisions; (2) the constitutional right of privacy, which
protects childbearing decisions; and (3) the constitutional rights of
illegitimate children, which protect the interests of nonmarital
children. Although these constitutional protections do not directly
anticipate posthumous conception,39 they do nonetheless provide an
apt paradigm for carefully delineating the rights of posthumous
children. Consequently, any treatment of posthumous children
should be consistent with these constitutional principles. This Note
draws from and analogizes to these constitutional doctrines to de-
rive an analytical framework that protects posthumous children
and simultaneously accommodates important state interests.
40
Part II of this Note examines common law and statutory pre-
sumptions of paternity, which fail to anticipate the posthumous
child, and outlines existing legislative and judicial responses to
posthumous conception. Part III describes the primary policy con-
cerns raised by posthumous conception that have informed the
various current approaches to the issue. Part IV sets the foundation
for delineating the rights of posthumous children by outlining the
constitutional status of the family, the constitutional right of pri-
vacy as it relates to reproductive rights, and the constitutional
rights of nonmarital children. Because states have unique interests
37. For a thorough discussion of inheritance issues in several contexts, including those
raised in this Note, see generally Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontradi-
tional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93.
38. This Note examines posthumous conception in the more typical context represented in
the Kolacy case, that of an established couple choosing to conceive through artificial means but
where the father dies before they are able to complete the process, and the mother nevertheless
conceives and bears a child using the father's gametes. The situation in which the woman dies
and the man decides to use her gametes to conceive would require a surrogacy arrangement,
which raises additional complexities due to a third-party's involvement. The overall framework
this Note recommends, however, is equally applicable to that situation and would merely require
additional measures to account for those complexities.
39. See infra Parts IV, V.
40. See infra Parts IV, V.
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and concerns that they would need to address in resolving the is-
sues raised by posthumous conception, this Note does not propose
specific legislative measures or decisional rules. Instead, in Part V,
this Note recommends an analytical framework to guide policymak-
ers in addressing the rights of posthumous children in a way that is
consistent with important constitutional constructs. As rapid tech-
nological developments have helped create this legal problem, an
overall guiding framework is necessary to adopt specific measures
that will inevitably need revision over time to remain consistent
with evolving technology. 41
II. POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION AND THE LAW
In contrast to initial antagonism towards the first successful
human artificial insemination procedure in America, 42 assisted re-
productive technologies today have become commonplace. 43 Ameri-
cans' use of fertility technology has helped create a multibillion-
dollar industry44 that shows no signs of abating.45 These reproduc-
tive technologies, however, have also created new legal questions
that traditional jurisprudence has not anticipated. 46 Posthumous
conception strains existing legal categories in ways that leave post-
humous children like Amanda and Elyse vulnerable, 47 but few state
legislatures have addressed the issue. Likewise, few courts have
had an opportunity to comment on the issue. The following is a dis-
cussion of the various legislative approaches and court cases that
have attempted to analyze posthumous conception.
41. As one writer has noted, "While the law should be responsive to technological develop-
ments, it should not be captive to them." Kerekes, supra note 29, at 242.
42. The first successful artificial insemination performed on a human in the United States
was conducted in 1866 by Dr. Marion Simms, nearly 100 years after the surgeon John Hunter
successfully performed the same procedure in England, in 1770. Dr. Simms, however, was forced
to forego further experimentation due to community opposition to what was considered a dis-
dainful act. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of
Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234 (1985-1986).
43. Id.; see also Brenwald & Redeker, supra note 29, at 605-06.
44. Brenwald & Redeker, supra note 29, at 623.
45. See id. at 606.
46. See James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues Raised by the In-
teraction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743,
744-46 (1998); see also Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to Be Born? Legislative Inaction
and the Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 993, 994 (1996).
47. See Bailey, supra note 46, at 744-46; Mika & Hurst, supra note 46, at 994.
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A. Legislative Responses
1. Intestate Inheritance Rights of Posthumous Children
The starting point for understanding the law concerning
posthumous conception is in the common law presumption of pater-
nity. Under the common law, if a husband and wife conceive a child
but the husband dies during the pregnancy, the resulting child is
presumed to be the legitimate child of the deceased father and enti-
tled to intestate succession rights if born within 280 days of the fa-
ther's death. 48 The Uniform Parentage Act extends the common law
presumption to 300 days.49 This presumptive period accounts for
typical gestation 50 and is intended to protect the deceased father's
estate against fraudulent claims. 51 Before the advent of cryopreser-
vation, 52 this presumption adequately protected the rights of such
children because it was not possible to postpone the gestational pe-
riod beyond which the presumption would no longer apply. Thus, if
the children fit within the presumption, they were deemed legiti-
mate and entitled to intestate inheritance from their deceased par-
ent.53 Cryopreservation, however, has nearly rendered this pre-
sumption "quaint and disturbingly arbitrary," since children can
now be born many years after their genetic parents have died.54 The
presumption does not encompass posthumous children because
their birth could occur well beyond the 280- or 300-day presumptive
period. Therefore, posthumous children are not deemed legal heirs
and are denied intestate inheritance rights from their deceased ge-
netic parents. 55
48. Bailey, supra note 46, at 745; Kerekes, supra note 29, at 214; Monica Shah, Comment,
Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous
Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 559 (1996).
49. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A. 377 (1973). Eighteen states have legislatively
adopted this presumption: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 397.
50. See Brashier, supra note 37, at 117-18 (discussing how this presumption, the Lord
Mansfield rule, applied). The presumption was irrebuttable if the mother's husband "had access
to her within the gestation period and was capable of procreating." Id.
51. For a good discussion of this presumption of paternity, see Brashier, supra note 37, at
117-21.
52. See supra note 29 (providing a definition of cryopreservation).
53. Kerekes, supra note 29, at 214-15.
54. Bailey, supra note 46, at 745.
55. Garside, supra note 29, at 723-25.
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2. The Uniform Status of the Children of Assisted Conception Act
The most direct legislative treatment of posthumous concep-
tion is the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
("USCACA"). 56 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws approved the USCACA in 1988 to address the con-
cerns created by reproductive technologies and to "clarify the rights
of children born under the new technology," who "because of acci-
dent of birth ... have been denied of certain basic rights. ' 57 Al-
though not widely adopted,58 the Act nonetheless provides an im-
portant and likely model for states to consult. The Act defines as-
sisted conception as "a pregnancy resulting from (i) fertilizing an
egg of a woman with sperm of a man by means other than sexual
intercourse or (ii) implanting an embryo, but the term does not in-
clude the pregnancy of a wife resulting from fertilizing her egg with
sperm of her husband."59 The Act's definition of assisted conception,
thus, generally excludes married couples. Section 4(b) of the Act,
however, applies directly to married persons attempting posthu-
mous conception and is, in fact, "the only provision in the Act which
would deal with procreation by those who are married to each
other. ' 60 Section 4(b) bars posthumous children from establishing
legal status as children of the deceased parent.61 The section pro-
vides that "[a]n individual who dies before implantation of an em-
bryo, or before a child is conceived other than through sexual inter-
course, using the individual's egg or sperm, is not a parent of the
resulting child."62 Therefore, the Act denies a child born through
posthumous conception rights of intestate inheritance in the estate
of the deceased parent.
3. Various State Approaches
To date, only two states, North Dakota and Virginia, have
adopted versions of the USCACA.63 Two other states, Florida and
Louisiana, have enacted their own legislation that addresses post-
56. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT ("USCACA"), 9C U.L.A. 363
(2001).
57. Id. at 364.
58. Only two states, North Dakota and Virginia, have adopted versions of the Act. See infra
Part II.A.3.a- .b.
59. USCACA, supra note 56, § 1(1), at 368.
60. Id. § 4(b), at 372.
61. Id. § 4(b), at 371.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 1(1), at 363.
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humous conception. 64 With the exception of Virginia, in certain nar-
row circumstances, 65 each of these legislative responses prevents
posthumous children outright from establishing a legal relationship
with their deceased genetic parents, which consequently denies the
children intestate inheritance rights and any survivor's benefits
from their deceased parents.
a. North Dakota
North Dakota was the first state to adopt the USCACA, and
the legislature essentially followed the original Act.66 Under the
North Dakota law, assisted conception is defined as "a pregnancy
resulting from insemination of an egg of a woman with sperm of a
man by means other than sexual intercourse or by removal and im-
plantation of an embryo after sexual intercourse but does not in-
clude a pregnancy resulting from the insemination of an egg of a
wife using her husband's sperm."67 In the case of posthumous con-
ception, "[a] person who dies before conception using that person's
sperm or egg is not a parent of any resulting child born of the con-
ception. ' 68 This statutorily defined parent-child relationship gov-
erns for purposes of intestate succession. 69 Therefore, a child born
through posthumous conception is denied a legal relationship with
the deceased parent and is consequently denied inheritance rights
from the deceased parent or that parent's other family members.
b. Virginia
In 1991, Virginia adopted a version of the USCACA that has
important differences from the original Act.70 Like the USCACA,
the Virginia statute sets forth the status of the posthumous child by
specifying that "any person who dies before in utero implantation of
an embryo resulting from the union of his sperm or her ovum with
another gamete, whether or not the other gamete is that of the per-
son's spouse, is not the parent of any resulting child."' 71 Virginia's
version of the Act, however, includes two important concessions.
First, the Virginia statute allows a posthumous child to obtain legal
64. See infra Parts II.A.3.c, d.
65. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
66. North Dakota adopted the USCACA in 1989. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-01 to -07 (1995).
67. Id. § 14-18-01.
68. Id. § 14-18-04.
69. Id. § 14-18-07.
70. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (Michie 1995).
71. Id. § 20-158B.
20021 1011
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
status as the deceased parent's child if that parent dies prior to
"implantation [but] before notice of the death can reasonably be
communicated to the physician performing the procedure." 72 Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the Virginia statute also allows a de-
ceased parent to affirmatively claim a legal relationship with the
child if he "consents to be a parent in writing executed before the
implantation. ' 73  This element differs significantly from the
USCACA and gives parents some control over their procreative op-
tions. Thus, a person can claim legal status as parent of the post-
humous child by clearly expressing such an intent while still alive.
This legal status, however, does not entitle the posthumous child to
intestate inheritance and other rights, unless the child was born
within ten months of the parent's death.7 4 This effectively negates
the unique features of Virginia's approach that at first glance ap-
pear to provide greater protections to the posthumous child.7 5
c. Florida
Florida has adopted legislation similar to the USCACA,
which provides that "[a] child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a
person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm,
or preembryos to a woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim
against the decedent's estate unless the child has been provided for
by the decedent's will."76 Thus, while Florida's statute does allow
the child to take under a decedent's will, the law does not allow a
posthumous child to establish a legal parent-child relationship with
the deceased parent. 77 Therefore, because the child is not the legal
heir of the deceased parent, the child would still be ineligible to in-
herit through intestate succession. 78
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 20-164 ("A child whose status as a child is declared or negated by this chapter is
the child only of his parent or parents as determined under this chapter... for all purposes
including, but not limited to, (i) intestate succession; (ii) probate law exemptions, allowances, or
other protections for children in a parent's estate; and (iii) determining eligibility of the child or
its descendants to share in a donative transfer from any person as an individual or as a member
of a class determined by reference to the relationship. However, a child born more than ten
months after the death of a parent shall not be recognized as such parent's child for the purposes
of subdivisions (i), (ii) and (iii) of this section." (emphasis added)).
75. Id.
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997); see also Banks, supra note 11, at 292 (discussing
the Florida statute).
77. Banks, supra note 11, at 292.
78. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17.
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d. Louisiana
Under Louisiana law, posthumous children have no inheri-
tance rights. 79 A posthumous child cannot inherit either by intes-
tate or testate succession because Louisiana law requires that the
heir "must exist at the death of the decedent. °80 The law further
specifies that to receive a causa mortis gift,8' the capacity of the
heir to receive the donation "must exist at the time of death of the
testator. ''8 2 Similarly, an heir's capacity to receive an inter vivos
gift83 under Louisiana law must "exist at the time the donee accepts
the donation."8 4 The law specifically addresses the situation of un-
born children and requires that, at the very least, the child must be
in utero before the donation or the testator's death.8 5 Accordingly,
because only the father's sperm or a cryopreserved embryo would




1. Reproductive Rights and Posthumous Conception
Few cases have specifically dealt with reproductive issues
involving a deceased person; five are discussed here to illustrate the
importance of establishing legal standards for determining the
rights of posthumous children. The first two cases address an indi-
vidual's right to have some control over his or her reproductive pre-
rogatives even in death. The remaining three cases involve actual
79. For a good discussion of Louisiana law as it relates to posthumous conception, see gen-
erally Garside, supra note 29, and Shah, supra note 48, at 565.
80. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 939 (West 2000).
81. A causa mortis gift is one "made in contemplation of the donor's imminent death."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999).
82. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1472 (West 2000).
83. An inter vivos gift is one "made during the donor's lifetime and delivered with the inten-
tion of irrevocably surrendering control over the property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 697 (7th ed.
1999).
84. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1472.
85. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1474 (West 2000) ("To be capable of receiving by donation inter
vivos, an unborn child must be in utero at the time the donation is made. To be capable of receiv-
ing by donation mortis causa, an unborn child must be in utero at the time of the death of the
testator. In either case, the donation has effect only if the child is born alive."); see also Shah,
supra note 48, at 565 (discussing Louisiana law).
86. Shah, supra note 48, at 565; see also Garside, supra note 29, at 717-26.
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children conceived through posthumous conception seeking to es-
tablish a legal relationship with their deceased parents.8 7
a. Parpalaix c. CECOS
The case that ushered in the "post-mortem insemination
era"88 was Parpalaix c. CECOS, decided in 1981 by the French
Tribunaux de grand instance. 89 Doctors diagnosed Alain Parpalaix
with testicular cancer at age twenty-four. 90 Before undergoing che-
motherapy, Alain deposited sperm at the Centre d'Etude et de Con-
servation du Sperme ("CECOS") but left no instructions as to how
the sperm should be disposed of if he died.91 When Alain deposited
the sperm, he was living with Corrine Richard, whom he later mar-
ried in a hospital ceremony when his cancer worsened. 92 Two days
after the wedding, Alain died.93 Later, CECOS denied Corrine's pe-
tition to release Alain's sperm to her on the basis that it owed a
contractual obligation only to Alain, generating the world's first
case to address the issue of how to determine the dispositional
rights of a dead man's sperm.94 The court refused to apply contract
principles to the case, describing sperm as "the seed of life ... tied
to the fundamental liberty of a human being to conceive or not to
conceive." 95 The court determined that the outcome of the case must
turn on the intent of the person who donated the sperm in the first
instance, and thus, decided in Corrine's favor, believing that it was
Alain's intent to have Corrine bear his child.96 This left Corrine free
to conceive a child posthumously using Alain's sperm, which she
attempted to do in 1984.9 7 Because the sperm quantity was too
small and of poor quality, however, her insemination procedure
failed.98
87. See infra Part II.B.2.
88. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 193 n.61 (noting that this designation "represents the time
frame since the Paraplaix [sic] case and refers to an era where the law has been surprised by the
increased popularity of post-mortem insemination and the resultant legal challenges").
89. This case is unreported, but is discussed at length in Gibbons, supra note 25, 192-93;
Mika & Hurst, supra note 46, at 1008-11; and Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 42, at 229.
90. Mika & Hurst, supra note 46, at 1008-09.
91. Id. at 1008-09.
92. Id. at 1009.
93. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 193.
94. Id. at 193.
95. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 42, at 232.
96. Mika & Hurst, supra note 46, at 1011.
97. Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 42, at 233.
98. Id. at 233.
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b. Hecht v. Superior Court
The Parpalaix case later influenced the California Court of
Appeal in its American counterpart, 99 Hecht v. Superior Court.100 In
Hecht,10 1 the court considered a deceased person's right to bequeath
sperm at death.10 2 Only days before committing suicide,'0 3 William
Kane preserved sperm for the express purpose of having his partner
of five years, Deborah Hecht, 10 4 bear his child posthumously.10 5 To
make this purpose known, Mr. Kane executed a will, stating: "I be-
queath all right, title, and interest that I may have in any speci-
mens of my sperm ... to Deborah Ellen Hecht.' ' 0 6 The will further
provided that Mr. Kane wished that Ms. Hecht "become impreg-
nated with my sperm" and made financial arrangements for "our
future child or children." 10 7 Mr. Kane also explicitly demonstrated
his intent to have Ms. Hecht bear his child posthumously in a letter
he wrote to his two adult children of an earlier marriage l08 and to
his "posthumous offspring, . . . with the thought that I have loved
you in my dreams, even though I never got to see you born."' 0 9 The
court rejected the claim of Mr. Kane's living children that allowing
an unmarried woman to undergo artificial insemination using a
dead man's sperm violated public policy." 0 The court held that pro-
tecting the fundamental right to procreate superceded concerns of
psychological harm that may theoretically result to existing chil-
dren."1 Consequently, the court upheld Ms. Hecht's claim and or-
dered that the sperm be released to her.
112
99. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 193.
100. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 287-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing Parpalaix).
101. For a good discussion of Hecht, see Gibbons, supra note 25, at 193-94, and Shah, supra
note 48, at 555-57.
102. The trial court in Hecht acknowledged the uniqueness of this issue, explaining, some-
what frustratingly, the legal basis of its ruling: "It really does not matter, does it? If I am right, I
am right and if I am wrong, I am wrong .... This is something that is going to have to be decided
by the appellate courts. Let's get a decision.... Obviously we are all agreed that we are forging
new frontiers because science has run ahead of common law. And we have got to have some sort
of appellate decision telling us what rights are in these uncharted territories." 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
280 n.3.
103. Id. at 277.
104. Id. at 276.
105. Id. at 283-84.
106. Id. at 276.
107. Id. at 277.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 289.
111. Id.; Mika & Hurst, supra note 46, at 1014.
112. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
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2. The Status of the Posthumous Child
In only three reported cases have courts been faced with an
actual posthumous child. These cases illustrate the legal issues fu-
ture posthumous children will face and the potential for litigation
in this area, particularly with respect to survivor's benefits and in-
heritance rights. 113 In these cases, the children were eventually rec-
ognized as the legal heirs of the deceased parent, but in each case,
the route to this end was circuitous and uncertain.
a. Hart v. Chater
The first U.S. case involving an actual posthumous child was
brought before an administrative law judge in 1991. In Hart v.
Chater,"4 Nancy Hart had used an assisted reproductive technology
to conceive a daughter using the preserved sperm of her deceased
husband, Edward Hart. 115 Before his death, Mr. Hart specifically
told his wife that "[tihere could always be a child for you," referring
to the possibility of using his preserved sperm." 6 When her daugh-
ter, Judith Christine, was born, Ms. Hart filed for Social Security
survivor's benefits and her request was initially granted. 117 The So-
cial Security Appeals Council, however, subsequently overturned
the grant, finding that Judith did not fall within any of the catego-
ries of dependent children who qualify for benefits under the Social
Security Act. 118 Because the Act relies on state law to make such
determinations, the Appeals Council based its denial on the fact
that under Louisiana law, Judith could not be considered Mr.
Hart's legitimate heir because she was conceived after his death. 19
Due to the unusual nature of Ms. Hart's petition, however, the So-
cial Security Commissioner later agreed to grant the petition and
pay survivor's benefits to Judith, acknowledging that posthumous
conception and related policy issues could not have been contem-
plated when the Social Security Act was passed.
120
113. See Shah, supra note 48, at 562.
114. This case is cited and discussed in Banks, supra note 11, at 251-56; Garside, supra note
29, at 720-22; Gibbons, supra note 25, at 193-94; Kerekes, supra note 29, at 232-40; and Shah,
supra note 48, at 561-62.
115. Gibbons, supra note 25, at 193-94. Edward Hart had died previously of non-Hodgkins
lymphoma of the esophagus. Id. at 194.
116. Id.
117. Shah, supra note 48, at 561-62.
118. Id. at 562.
119. Id. at 561-62; see also supra Part II.A.3.d (discussing the Louisiana law).
120. Shah, supra note 48, at 562.
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b. In re Estate of William J. Kolacy
The case of William Kolacy, 121 discussed in Part I, represents
only the second time that a court has addressed the legal status of a
posthumous child. In Kolacy, the court granted Amanda and Elyse
legal status as William Kolacy's children and heirs for a number of
reasons. 122 One important reason was that a person's property
rights are not static, but evolve over time. 123 Although William died
without any assets that could pass under New Jersey's intestate
laws, the court recognized that in the future, assets from William's
parents or siblings could pass to him through intestate succession,
which would then transfer to his surviving heirs. 124 In refusing to
apply a literal reading of the New Jersey statute, 125 the court noted
that estate law had long recognized certain exceptions to the rule
that the takers of a decedent's estate must be identified at the date
of death.126 Out of fairness, then, the process of identifying takers
from a decedent's estate must be held open long enough to identify
all eligible takers. 127 The court identified two such exceptions: first,
when the decedent impregnates a woman, but dies before the child
is born;128 and second, when a female relative of the decedent is
pregnant with a child who will qualify as a member of a class enti-
tled to inherit from the decedent. 129
Reviewing New Jersey's succession scheme, the court noted
that the legislature had not specified any public policy reason re-
garding posthumous conception, but it had identified a general leg-
islative intent that children "should be amply provided for" in the
event of their parent's death. 130 Accordingly, the court found that
this general intent to sufficiently provide for children should pre-
vail over a "restrictive, literal reading" of the statute. 131 Given that
the legislature had demonstrated that public policy favors providing
for children in the event of a parent's death, the court believed that
Amanda and Elyse's petition to be declared their father's legal chil-
121. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
122. Id. at 1264.
123. Id. at 1260.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1262. The statute, section 3B:5-8 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated, provides:
"Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had
been born in the lifetime of the decedent." Id. at 1260.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1261.
128. Id.
129. Id.




dren and heirs was appropriate, despite the unusual nature of their
conception and birth.
132
C. Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security
On January 2, 2002, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts became the first state court of last appeal to rule on the
rights of posthumous children and held that such children can gain
status as the legal heirs of their deceased parents. 133 In Woodward
v. Commissioner of Social Security, the Massachusetts high court,
answering a certified question from the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, 134 held that "[i]n certain limited circum-
stances, a child resulting from posthumous reproduction may enjoy
the inheritance rights of 'issue' under the Massachusetts intestacy
statute.'
35
The case involved Lauren Woodward, who was seeking Social
Security survivor's benefits for herself, as mother, and on behalf of
her two children after the death of her husband. 136 Three and a half
years after Warren and Lauren Woodward were married, Warren
was diagnosed with leukemia. 137 Before undergoing leukemia
treatments, Warren preserved some of his sperm after being ad-
vised that the treatments might render him sterile. 13 8 Warren died
ten months after being diagnosed, leaving Lauren a childless
widow. 139 Two years later, however, Lauren gave birth to twins who
were conceived through artificial insemination using Warren's pre-
served sperm.140 The Social Security Administration denied Lau-
ren's application for Social Security benefits because "the twins
were [not] the husband's 'children' within the meaning of the
132. Id.
133. Kathleen Burge, Those Conceived Posthumously Can Be Legal Heirs, SJC Rules,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 2002, at Al ("The state's highest court yesterday became the first in the
country to rule that children who are conceived with the frozen eggs or sperm of a deceased par-
ent can be considered legal heirs.").
134. The question certified by the federal district court was as follows: "If a married man and
woman arrange for sperm to be withdrawn from the husband for the purpose of artificially im-
pregnating the wife, and the woman is impregnated with that sperm after the man, her husband,
has died, will children resulting from such pregnancy enjoy the inheritance rights of natural
children under Massachusetts's law of intestate succession?" 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002).
135. Id.
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Act."141 Lauren then presented her claim to a federal administrative
law judge, who likewise held that the children could not qualify for
Social Security survivor's benefits because they were not "entitled
to inherit from [the husband] under the Massachusetts intestacy
and paternity laws. ' 142 Lauren thereafter appealed to the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts, which certified this
question to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court because of
the rare143 yet important 144 nature of this legal issue, and because
"no directly applicable Massachusetts precedent exists.1 45
In addressing the inheritance rights of posthumous children,
the Massachusetts court framed the issue as specifically implicat-
ing three important areas of concern: the best interests of the child,
the state's interest in the orderly administration of estates, and the
reproductive rights of the deceased parent.1 46 The court stressed
that its role is to "balance and harmonize these interests to effect
the Legislature's over-all purposes."1 47 Ascertaining the legisla-
ture's purposes regarding the best interests of the child, the court
specifically identified two issues. First, the court found that both
the judiciary and the legislature 148 have maintained an overriding
concern that all children should enjoy the same rights, regardless of
the circumstances of their birth.149 Consistent with this commit-
ment to equal treatment, the court identified the legislative policy
that wherever possible, children should be supported by their par-
ents to avoid potential dependence on public assistance.1 50 Second,
the court noted that because the legislature has "in great measure
affirmatively supported the assistive reproductive technologies that
141. Id.
142. Id. at 261.
143. Id. ("We have not previously been asked to consider whether our intestacy statute ac-
cords inheritance rights to posthumously conceived genetic children. Nor has any American court
of last resort considered, in a published opinion, the question of posthumously conceived genetic
children's inheritance rights under other States' intestacy laws.")
144. The Woodward court noted that the issues raised by posthumous conception are "unset-
tled" and "far reaching." Id. at 262.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 264-65.
147. Id. at 265.
148. Id. ("The protection of minor children, most especially those who may be stigmatized by
their 'illegitimate' status ... has been a hallmark of legislative action and of the jurisprudence of
this court." (citation omitted)).
149. Id. ("Repeatedly, forcefully, and unequivocally, the Legislature has expressed its will
that all children be entitled to the same rights and protections of the law regardless of the acci-
dents of their birth." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
150. Id. ("It is the public policy of this commonwealth that dependent children shall be main-
tained, as completely as possible, from the resources of their parents, thereby relieving or avoid-
ing, at least in part, the burden borne by the citizens of the commonwealth." (citation omitted)).
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are the only means by which these children can come into being,"
151
it would be irrational for the legislature to then allow "children who
are the fruit of that technology ... to have fewer rights and protec-
tions than other children."'
152
The court noted, however, that the interests of the posthu-
mous child, while important, are not alone decisive and must be
balanced against the state's interest "to provide certainty to heirs
and creditors by effecting the orderly, prompt, and accurate ad-
ministration of intestate estates."153 The court concluded that the
state's intestacy statute attempts to preserve this important state
interest by requiring "certainty of filiation between the decedent
and his issue"'154 and also by establishing relevant limitation peri-
ods for bringing a claim against the estate.1
55
Addressing the decedent's reproductive rights, the court
stated that posthumous conception necessarily implicates those
rights because "individuals have a protected right to control the use
of their gametes."'156 Therefore, the court held that in order for a
posthumous child to be eligible to gain inheritance rights, the de-
ceased parent must have consented both to the posthumous concep-
tion and to supporting the child. 157 The court stated that this two-
pronged requirement is necessary because the mere act of preserv-
ing gametes does not, of itself, indicate a desire to conceive posthu-
mously. 15 8 Furthermore, the court argued that without this consent
151. Id.
152. Id. "Posthumously conceived children may not come into the world the way the majority
of children do. But they are children nonetheless. We may assume that the Legislature intended
that such children be entitled, in so far as possible, to the same rights and protections of the law
as children conceived before death." Id. at 266 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. (citation omitted).
154. Id. "Because death ends a marriage, posthumously conceived children are always non-
marital children. And because the parentage of such children can be neither acknowledged nor
adjudicated prior to the decedent's death, it follows that, under the intestacy statute, posthu-
mously conceived children must obtain a judgment of paternity as a necessary prerequisite to
enjoying inheritance rights in the estate of the deceased genetic father." Id. at 266-67 (citations
omitted).
155. Id. at 266. In the case of posthumous children, the court identified two potential prob-
lems with the application of Massachusetts's one-year statute of limitations, but declined to
address the issue head on because the procedural posture of the case did not allow its full consid-
eration. Id. at 268. The first problem with such a short limitations period is the consequent re-
quirement that the surviving spouse would be forced to "make a decision to bear children while
in the freshness of grieving." Id. The second problem arises from the difficulty of some artificial
reproductive procedures, which can take, on average, seven attempts "over 4.4 menstrual cycles
to establish pregnancy." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 269.
157. Id.
158. Id. ("It will not always be the case that a person elects to have his or her gametes medi-
cally preserved to create 'issue' posthumously. A man, for example, may preserve his semen for
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requirement, "a court cannot be assured that the intestacy statute's
goal of fraud prevention is satisfied."'159
Therefore, to effectuate the balancing of these three impor-
tant interests, the Woodward court provided a three-factor test to
determine whether a posthumous child can qualify as the legal heir
of a deceased parent. The surviving parent (or legal representative
of the child) must satisfy three requirements: (1) prove a genetic
relationship with the decedent; (2) demonstrate the decedent "af-
firmatively consented" to posthumous conception; and (3) demon-
strate that the decedent consented "to the support of any resulting
child."'160 The court favored this approach over a rule always (or
never) granting posthumous children inheritance rights because in
this "developing and relatively uncharted area of human relations,
bright-line rules are not favored."'
161
III. COMPETING POLICY CONCERNS
As Kolacy and Woodward illustrate, there is something
awkward in refusing to recognize posthumous children as the legal
offspring of their deceased fathers when it is indisputable that he is
the genetic parent. 62 Accordingly, the Kolacy court found ways to
work around a literal reading of the New Jersey statute in order to
declare the children the legal heirs of their deceased father. 63 The
court was confident in making this decision, because in that par-
ticular case, there were no estate administration problems and
there were "no competing interests of other persons who were alive
at the time of William Kolacy's death which would be unfairly frus-
trated by recognizing Amanda and Elyse as his heirs.
'16 4
The Woodward court likewise interpreted Massachusetts law
generously to establish the possibility that posthumous children
myriad reasons, including, among others: to reproduce after recovery from medical treatment, to
reproduce after an event that leaves him sterile, or to reproduce when his spouse has a genetic
disorder or otherwise cannot have or safely bear children. That a man has medically preserved
his gametes for use by his spouse thus may indicate only that he wished to reproduce after some
contingency while he was alive, and not that he consented to the different circumstance of creat-
ing a child after his death."). But see infra note 188 and accompanying text.
159. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 270.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 262.
162. As one commentator has noted, "Without legislative action, these children will remain
the legal child of no father, a most anomalous concept in modern jurisprudence." Kerekes, supra
note 29, at 243.
163. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
164. Id. at 1262.
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could be considered "issue"165 for intestate inheritance purposes be-
cause they are the lineal, genetic offspring of the deceased par-
ent. 166 The court reasoned that because the Massachusetts intes-
tacy law did not contain "an express, affirmative requirement that
posthumous children must 'be in existence' as of the date of the de-
cedent's death,"'167 it could consider whether posthumous children
should be afforded the same inheritance rights as children con-
ceived before the decedent's death. 168 While the Woodward decision
goes a long way toward a more equitable solution to some of the
unique issues created by reproductive technologies, posthumous
conception raises important policy concerns that will increasingly
demand a more complete response from legislatures.
A. Orderly Administration of Estates
States have an important interest in the orderly administra-
tion of estates and the distribution of property at death. 169 The U.S.
Supreme Court has affirmed that this area of law is "particularly
within the competence of the individual states.' 170 Consistent with
this interest, legislative responses to posthumous conception have
focused narrowly on protecting the stability of estate administra-
tions. 17' The USCACA clearly identifies this policy justification. The
Act establishes that the primary purpose of denying a legal parent-
child relationship to posthumous children is to "provide finality for
the determination of parenthood of those whose genetic material is
utilized in the procreation process after death."'172 According to the
drafters of the Act, such finality is necessary to "avoid the problems
of intestate succession which could arise if the posthumous use of a
person's genetic material could lead to the deceased being termed a
parent."'173 Although the comment to section 4(b) acknowledges that
parents can "explicitly provide for such children in their wills,"'174
posthumous children cannot take in the parent's estate through in-
165. While "issue" was not defined in the intestacy statute, the court noted that the term
generally refers to "lineal (genetic) descendants," including marital and nonmarital. 760 N.E.2d
at 263.
166. Id. at 262-64.
167. Id. at 264.
168. Id.
169. Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 855 (1986).
170. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977).
171. See supra Part II.A.
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testate inheritance because "implantation after the death of any
genetic parent would not result in that genetic parent being the le-
gally recognized parent."'
175
The Kolacy court specifically acknowledged this concern,
stating that "[e]states cannot be held open for years simply to allow
for the possibility that after born children may come into existence.
People alive at the time of a decedent's death who are entitled to
receive property from the decedent's estate are entitled to receive it
reasonably promptly."'176 The Woodward court also identified the
important state interest in "provid[ing] certainty to heirs and credi-
tors by effecting the orderly, prompt, and accurate administration
of intestate estates.'1 77 To address these and similar concerns,
those states that have faced this issue have chosen to prevent post-
humous children from establishing a legal relationship with their
deceased parents. 178 This ensures stability by preventing posthu-
mous children from interfering with the administration of the de-
ceased parent's estate after it has been closed. The distribution of a
decedent's estate will therefore remain undisturbed, even if that
person's genetic material is subsequently used to conceive a post-
humous child.
B. The Welfare of the Child
A competing area of important policy concern involves the
welfare of posthumous children. 179 All children have a real need for
175. Id.
176. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). Although
the court did not provide an adequate framework for dealing with this issue in a broader way, it
did identify some specific measures that could reduce estate problems. See infra note 398.
177. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266 (Mass. 2002) (citation omitted):
[T]he best interests of the posthumously conceived child . . . must be balanced
against other important State interests, not the least of which is the protection
of children who are alive or conceived before the intestate parent's death. In an
era in which serial marriages, serial families, and blended families are not un-
common, according succession rights under our intestacy laws to posthumously
conceived children may, in a given case, have the potential to pit child against
child and family against family. Any inheritance rights of posthumously con-
ceived children will reduce the intestate share available to children born prior
to the decedent's death. Such considerations, among others, lead us to examine
... the orderly, prompt, and accurate administration of intestate interests.
178. See supra Part II.A.
179. The Woodward court considered the best interests of the child to be a very important
element in their treatment of this issue. "First and foremost, we consider the overriding legisla-
tive concern to promote the best interests of children." 760 N.E.2d at 265. In other areas of do-
mestic law, courts view the child's welfare as a top priority because of the impact any particular
decision might have on the child. For example, in child custody disputes, courts apply a "best
interests of the child" standard that considers several factors to determine what is best for the
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emotional and financial support, and posthumous children are, of
course, no different.180 The parent-child relationship is the primary
means of fulfilling these needs, so denying posthumous children the
right to establish a legal relationship with their deceased parents
has consequential implications. 8 1 Since posthumous children will
typically be born into a single-parent home, it is reasonable to as-
sume that in many cases the family resources will be limited. 8 2 De-
nying these children intestate inheritance rights and survivor's
benefits puts even greater financial strain on the family, particu-
larly in light of the purpose of such benefits, providing financial
resources for those loved ones left without the income of a deceased
parent or spouse. The USCACA attempts to address this problem by
allowing parents to provide for posthumous children in their
wills. 183 While this may provide relief for some posthumous chil-
dren, it is not an effective measure since most people die intes-
tate. 8 4 Also, those people who would typically resort to posthumous
conception are likely to be younger and at a stage in their lives
where estate planning might not yet be a major concern.18 5 Even if a
prospective parent of a posthumous child did create a will, however,
such a parent cannot bequeath insurance or Social Security benefits
to the posthumous child, which are likely the most significant as-
sets many such young people would have.
child's well being in that situation. As articulated in section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, the best interests test states:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents,
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not af-
fect his relationship to the child.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1988).
180. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
181. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265 ("Among the many rights and protections vouchsafed to
all children are rights to financial support from their parents and their parents' estates.").
182. Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive
Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1158 (1997) ("[C]hildren of single parents are often in
need of public support or, at least, are economically disadvantaged.").
183. USCACA, supra note 56, § 4 cmt., at 372.
184. Kerekes, supra note 29, at 225 (citing JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 67 (5th ed. 1995)).
185. Id. at 225-26 (commenting that the USCACA's provision for a parent to provide for a
posthumous child in a will as "altogether facile" because it would "confer little benefit to the
intestate non-heir").
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Moreover, intestate inheritance statutes are intended to "ap-
proximate a decedent's wishes" when that person did not have the
opportunity to express those wishes in life.186 Statutes setting forth
the inheritance rights of posthumous children that do not take into
account the parent's perspective,18 7 which would undoubtedly be to
support the children, 88 are thus inconsistent with the longstanding
purpose of intestate succession. As one commentator has noted, it is
"illogical to assume a decedent would desire to prevent a genetic
child from sharing in the estate.'81 9 Furthermore, this situation de-
nies posthumous children the less tangible benefits of having a le-
gally and socially recognized parent. This is no small matter given
the paramount importance of the family in society 90 and the bonds
of family that are widely felt to transcend death. 91 Denying post-
humous children the right to establish a legally recognized rela-
tionship with their deceased parent could therefore have significant
emotional consequences in addition to those financial ones.
92
186. McAllister, supra note 34, at 101.
187. Id.
188. Indeed, even when the parent refuses to acknowledge a parent-child relationship, in
cases that do not involve posthumous conception, courts require a parent to provide support to a
biological child. See, e.g., In re L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. 1983) (requir-
ing father to provide child support even when mother purposely deceived him regarding her use
of contraceptives); see also Straub v. B.M.T. ex rel. Todd, 645 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind. 1994) (citing
the "utmost importance" of Indiana's public policy of protecting the welfare of children, the court
deemed void a preconception contract intended to absolve the father of future support obliga-
tions, and commenting that "[n]either parent has the right to contract away... support benefits.
The right to the support lies exclusively with the child.")
189. Kerekes, supra note 29, at 240.
190. See infra Part IV.A.
191. The expansive interest in genealogy reflects the deep importance people place on identi-
fying with and relating to their deceased family members. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, In Libraries
and Cemeteries, Vacationing with Ancestors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, at Al (citing a recent
survey reporting that sixty percent of Americans are interested in tracing their family roots).
The level of interest in genealogy has grown over the years, but it is not something new. See, e.g.,
David Gelman et al., Everybody's Search for Roots, NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1977, at 26 (noting the
interest in researching family histories among diverse ethnic groups in America around the time
of the country's bicentennial).
192. For example, in a high-profile case in England, Diane Blood fought for nearly two years
to have her husband's name registered as the father on her son's birth certificate. Posthumous
Fathers to Be Recognized, BBC NEWS ONLINE, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english-
Ihealth/newsid_895000/895544.stm (Aug. 25, 2000). Her husband had previously died, and Ms.
Blood used his sperm to conceive and bear a son posthumously. Id. Under British law, however, a
posthumous child was registered as fatherless. Id. In response to this case, the British govern-
ment established a review of relevant law and subsequently recommended that men who become
fathers by posthumous conception can have their names registered on their babies' birth certifi-
cates. Id. As Ms. Blood stated, "It is very important for these children and their mothers because
it means that the biological facts will be recorded as they truly are. Until now mothers have
effectively had to lie when asked whether they knew the father of their child." Id.
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As the incidence of posthumous conception increases, courts
and legislatures will need to address these competing policy con-
cerns more fully. Both the indeterminate approach taken by the
Kolacy court 193 and the absolute ban approach taken by states 194
will prove inadequate to accommodate and balance fairly the inter-
ests of posthumous children with the interests of states. 95 Fur-
thermore, because posthumous conception relates to some of soci-
ety's most basic values concerning the family and reproduction, any
balancing of these competing interests should be consistent with
longstanding constitutional doctrines that protect the family. 96 The




The family occupies a uniquely important place in society
and warrants constitutional status and protection.1 98 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has recognized this importance and has developed a
substantial body of jurisprudence that firmly establishes "the fun-
damental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children."199 The Court also has estab-
193. Although the Kolacy court recognized some of the potential inheritance problems that
could arise from recognizing posthumous children as legal heirs of their deceased parents, the
court did not provide an analytical framework for deciding these issues. See supra note 176.
Instead, the court noted New Jersey's legislative prerogative in this area and referred to a judi-
cial authority that in the absence of legislation "[i]t would undoubtedly be fair and constitutional
for courts to impose limits on the ability of after born children to take in particular cases." In re
Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). The court essentially took
a "do no harm" approach, but this approach lacks consistency and would not produce fairness
because it does not provide reliable guidance to balance the state's and the child's competing
interests. Id.
194. See supra Part II.A.3.
195. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, From Cradle to Tomb: Estate Planning Considerations of the
New Procreation, 57 LA. L. REV. 27, 45 (1996) ("Regardless of the state's articulated position on
posthumous reproduction, the rights of any resulting child must be considered. For even if the
state were to prohibit posthumous conception or posthumous implantation of the embryos, some
children may still be born as a result of the techniques.").
196. See infra Part IV.
197. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264-65 (Mass. 2002) ("The question
whether posthumously conceived genetic children may enjoy inheritance rights implicates three
powerful State interests: the best interests of children, the State's interest in the orderly admini-
stration of estates, and the reproductive rights of the genetic parent. Our task is to balance and
harmonize these interests to effect the Legislature's over-all purposes.").
198. See infra Part IV.A.
199. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
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lished that this fundamental right of parents to control the upbring-
ing of their children must encompass the prerequisite condition
necessary for parents to exercise that right, namely to have chil-
dren in the first place.200 The Court has also addressed the status of
nonmarital children. 201 Because family circumstances often create
additional burdens for such children, the Court has established im-
portant protections for them. 20 2 The cases dealing with nonmarital
children are instructive in developing an analytical framework for
determining the rights of posthumous children, because they pro-
vide a closely analogous situation to posthumous children, who are
also left without at least one parent's support. Although the Court
may not have directly anticipated the many advances in reproduc-
tive technology, posthumous conception nonetheless implicates the
meaning and potency of these constitutional protections. Posthu-
mous conception represents a new means by which hopeful parents
can exercise the right that is at the heart of the Court's decisions-
the right to create a family by conceiving children. Without post-
humous conception, many parents would be denied this opportu-
nity. Therefore, issues raised by posthumous conception should be
viewed against the backdrop of the Court's "extensive precedent"
20 3
in these areas of parental liberties, and any determination of the
rights of posthumous children should be consistent with these con-
stitutional doctrines.
A. The Constitutional Status of the Family
The constitutional status of the family is not an inflexible
distinction but, rather, one that recognizes the underlying impor-
tance of the family's role in society and has adapted to changing
circumstances. 20 4 This bears directly on the issue of posthumous
conception, because it is yet another way the family is adapting to a
changing society. Posthumous children belong to a family in which
both of their parents chose to conceive them in the only way they
were able to do so in their individual circumstances.
As early as 1877, the Supreme Court began expressly to af-
firm, as a matter of constitutional law, the importance of the family
200. See infra Part IV.B.1.
201. See infra Part IV.C.
202. See infra Part IV.C.
203. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
204. See id. at 64; see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977) (dis-
cussing the constitutional status of the family).
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in society. 20 5 In 1923, the Court decided the seminal case of Meyer v.
Nebraska,20 6 which is the foundation of the Court's modern juris-
prudence on the family and the right of privacy. 20 7 In Meyer, the
Court struck down a Nebraska criminal statute that prohibited the
teaching of foreign languages to children who had not completed
the eighth grade, in part, because it unconstitutionally interfered
with the right of parents to direct the education of their children. 20 8
The Court declared that the liberty guaranteed under the Four-
teenth Amendment 209 included "the right ... to marry [and] estab-
lish a home and bring up children."210 As the Court has subse-
quently asserted, this fundamental right of parents "is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court."
2 1 1
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held
unconstitutional an Oregon statute that mandated compulsory at-
tendance at public schools for all children between eight and six-
teen years of age because it "unreasonably interfere[d]" with paren-
tal liberties. 212 The Court asserted that "[t]he fundamental theory of
liberty ... excludes any general power of the state to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teach-
ers only. ' 213 Meyer and Pierce form the foundations of the Court's
subsequent decisions involving the family and punctuate any in-
quiry of government intrusions into the family. 214 An important
205. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78-81 (1877) (sustaining the validity of a marriage despite
being entered into contrary to Michigan law, and holding that, although it is the "policy of the
state to encourage" marriage, the state does not "confer the right" to enter marriage because
"marriage is a thing of common right"); see also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1888)
(describing marriage, hyperbolically, as the most important relationship "affecting the happiness
of individuals, the first step from barbarism to incipient civilization, the purest tie of social life,
and the true basis of human progress" and the "foundation of the family and society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress" (quoting Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480,
484-85 (1863))).
206. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
207. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-84 (1965)
(discussing privacy rights).
208. 262 U.S. at 400-01.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").
210. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
211. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
212. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
213. Id. at 535.
214. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.... [Ilt is in recognition of
this that [our] decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter.").
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principle running throughout the Court's decisions is the Pierce
Court's admonition against attempting to "standardize" children or
the family. 215 This is relevant to posthumous conception, because
the various statutory approaches to this issue amount to an at-
tempt to restrict the constitutional protections of the family to only
those created by traditional means, denying posthumous children
the ability to assert their legal status as members of the family that
brought them into the world.
In Loving v. Virginia, the Court further recognized that a
state cannot attempt to standardize the family by restricting an
individual's right to determine whom to marry. 216 In striking down
Virginia's miscegenation statute, which prohibited interracial mar-
riage, 217 the Court noted that "the freedom to marry or not marry a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed upon by the State. '218 Indeed, the Court's cases have con-
sistently demonstrated, in a wide variety of circumstances, that the
Constitution provides a high degree of protection for the family,
21 9
215. 268 U.S. at 535.
216. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
217. Id. at 4.
218. Id. at 12. In finding that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protec-
tion guarantee, the Court affirmed the principle that marriage, the traditional means of creating
a family, is a "fundamental freedom" that "has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id.
219. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("In a long line of cases,
we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the liberty
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, to have children, to
direct the education and upbringing of one's children, [and] to marital privacy." (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (upholding the mari-
tal family against assertion by natural father of parental rights over child conceived adulterously
with married woman, in part, because "the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family pre-
cisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (holding that the
right to enter the "constitutionally protected marital relationship" survives even the prison con-
text); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) ("The absence of dispute reflected this
Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fun-
damental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584, 603 (1979) ("The statist notion that governmental power should supersede parental author-
ity in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradi-
tion."); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) ("It is not surprising that the decision to
marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships.... [I]t would make little sense to recognize a
right of privacy which respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision
to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society."); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) ('We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship be-
tween parent and child is constitutionally protected."); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842, 845-47 (1977) (holding that the Constitution does not
allow for an unduly narrow conception of the family, as a mere "creation of state law," but that
the liberty interest in family privacy is an "intrinsic human right," which protects it from unjus-
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which importantly distinguishes it from "mere[ ] ... shifting eco-
nomic arrangements.' 220
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court struck down a
city ordinance that restricted the occupancy of a dwelling to an
"unusual and complicated" definition of family that included only
certain categories of related persons. 221 In noting the Pierce Court's
admonition that the Constitution denies the states any power to
standardize children through mandatory public school atten-
dance,222 the Court stated that "the Constitution prevents East
Cleveland from standardizing its children and its adults by forcing
all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."223
tified governmental interference); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (holding that
a state's police power can be constitutionally exercised to establish zoning ordinances that pro-
mote "family values"); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This
Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) ("Our prior decisions recognizing a right
to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment included only personal rights that can be
deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. This privacy right encompasses
and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation,
and child rearing." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972) (holding Wisconsin's compulsory education law unconstitutional, and further affirming
that the "history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern
for the nurture and upbringing of their children," and that the "primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradi-
tion"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that an Illinois statute which pre-
sumed unwed fathers as unfit to raise their children after the biological mother's death violated
the Equal Protection Clause because the "private interest here, that of a man in the children he
has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing in-
terest, protection," and stating that "[iut is plain that the interest of a parent in the companion-
ship, care, custody, and management of his or her children 'come(s) to this Court with a momen-
tum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting eco-
nomic arrangements' " (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring))); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("We deal with a right of privacy
older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system. Mar-
riage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree
of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-
52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life.
And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its
protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right.").
220. Yoder, 405 U.S. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. 431 U.S. 494, 495-96 (1977). Furthermore, the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family because it is deeply rooted in America's history and tradition and because the family is
the social institution through which "we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural." Id. at 503-04.
222. Id. at 506.
223. Id.
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The Court's recent decision in this area, Troxel v. Gran-
ville,224 firmly rests on this foundation. In Troxel, the Court held
unconstitutional a Washington state visitation law that allowed a
court to grant visitation of a child to anyone, whenever the court
found it to "serve the best interest of the child. ' 225 The Court found
the statute "breathtakingly broad"226 in that it allowed any third
party to subject a parent's decision regarding the associations of her
children to judicial review. 227 The Court held that the statute in-
fringed upon the "fundamental constitutional right [of parents] to
make decisions concerning the rearing" of their own children,228
which must be given "special weight. '229
As Justice Souter noted in his concurrence, "[o]ur cases, it is
true, have not set out exact metes and bounds to the protected in-
terest of a parent in the relationship with his child, but Meyer's re-
peatedly recognized right of upbringing would be a sham if it failed
to encompass the right to be free of judicially compelled visitation
by 'any party' at 'any time' a judge believed he 'could make a "bet-
ter" decision' than the objecting parent had done. '230 Justice Souter
then further reaffirmed the Court's commitment to the para-
mountcy of the family: "To say the least (and as the Court implied
in Pierce), parental choice in such matters is not merely a default
rule."
231
These family cases establish the lens through which to view
the issue of posthumous conception, since it falls within the realm
of family and parental prerogatives that children are desired and
eventually brought into the world, even if through unconventional
means. Furthermore, the Court has consistently maintained that
the family is not a static social institution but one that adapts as
society changes. The constitutional protections of the family are
likewise flexible in that they do not apply merely to a narrowly de-
fined family pattern, 232 but recognize the underlying importance of
the role that family plays both in society and in the lives of indi-
224. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
225. WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1998).
226. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 69.
229. Id. The Court further stated that "the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to in-
fringe on the fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state
judge believes a 'better' decision could be made." Id. at 72-73.
230. Id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 79.
232. See, e.g., id. at 62-67, 72-73; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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viduals. 233 By allowing people to establish families where they
would otherwise have been unable, reproductive technologies, in-
cluding posthumous conception, are contributing to some of the
changes in family structure that the Court has recognized. Conse-
quently, the rights of posthumous children must not be viewed
merely from an economic perspective for the determination of prop-
erty distribution at death, but must also incorporate the richer and
deeper bond that inheres in the parent-child relationship, which the
Court's family cases have recognized.
B. The Fundamental Liberty Interest to Procreate
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed only two instances in
which a person's affirmative liberty to procreate was threatened.
234
While only one of these cases supports the existence of a fundamen-
tal right to procreate, 235 the Court's subsequent cases delineating
the right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly es-
tablish such a right.236 This right to procreate also extends to pro-
creation through artificial reproductive technologies. 237
1. Constitutional Right to Make Procreative Choices
The Court's earliest opinion touching on procreation is the
1927 decision Buck v. Bell. 238 In Buck, the Court upheld a Virginia
statute that allowed the compulsory sterilization of certain "mental
defectives. ' '239 The statute targeted institutionalized persons af-
flicted with "hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, etc.," 240 to pre-
vent them from propagating offspring who would inherit such afflic-
tions and to promote the patient's health and the "welfare of soci-
ety."241 While Buck does not support an affirmative right to procre-
233. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04.
234. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
235. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538.
236. See infra Part IV.B.1.
237. See infra Part IV.B.2; see also Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376-77 (N.D. Ill.
1990). Many others have argued that the existence of such a fundamental right to procreate can
clearly be inferred from the Court's right of privacy decisions, and that this right to procreate
should encompass the right to use artificial reproductive technologies to effectuate pregnancy in
order to fulfill this right. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 46, at 778-79; Gibbons, supra note 25, at
195-202; Gilbert, supra note 29, at 531-38; Mika & Hurst, supra note 46, at 1000-07.
238. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
239. Id. at 205.
240. Id. at 206.
241. Id. at 205.
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ate, the Court's reasoning and subsequent cases demonstrate its
holding as anachronistic.
242
Only fifteen years later, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,243 the
Court provided strong support for an affirmative right to procreate.
While straining to not expressly overturn its decision in Buck,244 the
Court announced that procreation is "fundamental to the very exis-
tence and survival of the race"245 and "one of the basic civil rights of
man."246 The Court held that Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterili-
zation Act, which allowed the state to sterilize persons "convicted
two or more times for crimes amounting to felonies involving moral
turpitude," 247 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because it infringed upon the fundamental
"right to have offspring. 248
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court asserted that the spe-
cific rights set forth in the Bill of Rights are made more secure by
recognizing "peripheral" or penumbral rights, which "create zones
of privacy" 249 upon which the government cannot infringe without a
compelling interest that is narrowly tailored to effectuate only that
interest.250 One such zone of privacy inheres in the marriage
relationship, which the Court recognized as specifically
encompassing procreative decisions. 251 The Court held that a
Connecticut statute, which barred the use and distribution of
242. For example, Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, provided the following rationale
for the decision:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to
be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incom-
petence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can pre-
vent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle
that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fal-
lopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.
Id. at 207 (citation omitted). This reasoning is simply unsustainable in light of
changes in societal attitudes and the Court's own cases bearing on procreation.
243. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
244. See, e.g., id. at 542 (stating that Buck had at least one "saving feature[:] It applied only
to feeble-minded persons in institutions of the State. But it was pointed out that 'so far as the
operations enable those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and
thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.' " (quoting
Buck, 274 U.S. at 208)).
245. Id. at 541.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 536 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 173 (1935)).
248. Id.
249. 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
250. Id. at 496-97 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
251. See, e.g., id. at 485-86 ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."); see also id. at 497 (Goldberg, J.,
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which barred the use and distribution of contraceptives, violated
this fundamental right to privacy in marriage because of the
"maximum destructive impact" 25 2 that it had on the "intimate rela-
tion of husband and wife." 253
While Griswold established a fundamental right to privacy
in the marriage relationship only, the Court extended this protec-
tion to the individual in Eisenstadt v. Baird.254 The Court reasoned
that because the marital privacy recognized in Griswold protects
two independent and distinct individuals, this protection should
apply equally to a single person. 25 The Court announced that "[i]f
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individ-
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."256 Accordingly, the Court
invalidated the Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribu-
tion of contraceptives to unmarried persons. 25 7
Fusing these earlier holdings, the Court, in Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International, firmly settled the right of an individual
to make procreative decisions as fundamental. 258 The Court an-
nounced that such decisions are "at the very heart of ... constitu-
tionally protected choices."259 Therefore, regulations infringing upon
concurring) (responding to the dissenters in Griswold who would have upheld the law because no
constitutional provision "specifically prevents the Government from curtailing the marital right
to bear children," Justice Goldberg stated: "While it may shock some of my Brethren that the
Court today holds that the personal liberty guaranteed by the Constitution protects the right of
marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the Constitution does not
include protection against such totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete vari-
ance with our constitutional concepts."). Justice Harlan argued in concurrence that the statute
infringed upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it violated "basic
values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' " Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
252. Id. at 485.
253. Id. at 482.
254. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
255. Id. at 453 ("It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup.").
256. Id.
257. Id. at 454-55.
258. 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977) (noting that laws limiting access to contraceptives must
pass strict scrutiny "not because there is an independent fundamental 'right of access to contra-
ceptives,' but because such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected right of
decision in matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the holdings in Griswold,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade").
259. Id. at 685.
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"decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception"260 must
be justified by a compelling state interest.261 This language is im-
portant because the Court clearly established that decisions to "ac-
complish" conception-and not merely prevent or terminate preg-
nancy-are protected by the right of privacy. 262
2. The Right to Procreate and Reproductive Technology
The Court in Carey specifically recognized that the right of
privacy protects "independence in making certain kinds of impor-
tant decisions,"263 of which procreative determinations are central,
but that the "outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been
marked by the Court. ' 264 Accordingly, lower courts have interpreted
the fundamental right of privacy to encompass not only the right to
prevent or terminate pregnancy through artificial means, but also
the right to bring about pregnancy through artificial means. 265 In
Lifchez v. Hartigan,266 the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois invalidated a provision of Illinois's abortion law that
prohibited experimentation on a human fetus unless the experi-
mentation was therapeutic to the fetus.267 The court held the stat-
ute unconstitutional because it was vague268 and, more importantly,
because it infringed upon a woman's "fundamental right ... to
make reproductive choices free of governmental interference. '2
69
The court noted that one so-called experimental procedure likely
prohibited by the statute, "embryo transfer,"270 was designed spe-
cifically to enable an infertile woman to "bear her own child. '271
Holding that this procedure clearly fell within the zone of privacy
recognized by the Supreme Court, the Lifchez court stated that it
260. Id.
261. Id. at 685-86.
262. Id. at 686.
263. Id. at 684 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
264. Id.
265. As one writer has commented, "If the right of a woman to privacy, as construed by the
Court, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate [or prevent]
her pregnancy by artificial means, the right by analogy is sufficiently broad to encompass a
woman's decision to initiate pregnancy by artificial means." Joseph A. Silvoso II, Note, Artificial
Insemination: A Legislative Remedy, 3 W. ST. U. L. REV. 48, 55-56 (1975) (emphasis added),
quoted in Gilbert, supra note 29, at 536.
266. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
267. Id. at 1376.
268. Id. at 1364.
269. Id. at 1376.
270. Embryo transfer is a procedure that involves removing a fertilized embryo from a




"takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of consti-
tutionally protected choices that includes the right to have access to
contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster the right
to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than
prevent, pregnancy. 272
The California Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Calvert,273 also
explored the boundaries of the fundamental right to procreate and
endorsed the position that reproductive technologies fall within the
zone of privacy. In holding that the gamete providers in a surrogacy
arrangement were the child's natural and legal parents, 274 not the
surrogate mother, the court stated that "any ... effort [to inhibit
the use of reproductive technology] would raise serious questions in
light of the fundamental nature of the rights of procreation and pri-
vacy."275 Furthermore, rejecting the surrogate mother's argument
that by tradition she should be declared the child's natural and le-
gal parent because she is the "birth mother," the court viewed re-
productive technology as a means to exercise long-recognized, con-
stitutionally protected rights.276 The court held that "[t]o the extent
that tradition has a bearing on the present case, we believe it sup-
ports the claim of the couple who exercise their right to procreate in
order to form a family of their own, albeit through novel medical
procedures."
277
In Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court likewise
provided support for the view that the right of privacy protects the
use of reproductive technology. 278 In Davis, the court faced the first
impression issue of the disposition of cryogenically preserved em-
bryos in a divorce case.279 An ex-husband objected to the initial in-
tent of his ex-wife to use the embryos in a post-divorce attempt to
become pregnant 280 and her subsequent desire to donate the em-
bryos to a childless couple for the same purpose. 28' Noting the
unique nature of the case, 28 2 the court recognized the right of pri-
272. Id. at 1377.
273. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
274. Id. at 777-78.
275. Id. at 787.
276. Id. at 786.
277. Id.
278. 842 S.W.2d 588, 600-02 (Tenn. 1992).
279. Id. at 589.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 590.
282. The court noted that, despite more than 5,000 babies born through in vitro fertilization
and more than 20,000 cryogenically preserved embryos in the U.S., "we have no case law to guide
us to a decision in this case." Id.
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vacy was implicated by the ex-husband's objection to using the em-
bryos. 283 The court asserted the father's desire to avoid "genetic
parenthood" was "significant enough to trigger the protections af-
forded to all other aspects of parenthood. '284 The court held in favor
of the ex-husband, since his "liberty to procreate or avoid procrea-
tion" was directly involved. 28 5 The Court further stated that "how-
ever far the protection of procreative autonomy extends, the exis-
tence of the right itself dictates that decisional authority rests in
the gamete providers alone, at least to the extent that their deci-
sions have an impact upon their individual reproductive status. '286
The holdings of Lifchez,287 Johnson,288 and Davis289 combined
with the holdings of Skinner,29° Griswold,291 Eisenstadt,292 and
Carey293 establish that the fundamental right to procreate encom-
passes the use of reproductive technology to "bring about, rather
than prevent, pregnancy." 294 Courts have yet to determine whether
this principle is broad enough to encompass posthumous conception
as an exercise of the deceased father's fundamental right to procre-
ate.
Admittedly, the Court has never held that a person's consti-
tutional rights survive death.295 Nevertheless, taken together, Par-
palaix296 and Hecht297 (and to some extent, Davis298 ) lead to the con-
clusion that a nonanonymous donor of sperm has dispositional
rights over his preserved sperm both during his life and, if intent
can be clearly shown, after his death. 299 In this way, courts have
already recognized and honored the intent of a deceased person
concerning his procreative choices, which are protected by the con-
stitutional right of privacy. Indeed, in the last iteration of the Hecht
case, the California Court of Appeal, in an unpublished opinion,
283. Id. at 603-04.
284. Id. at 603.
285. Id. at 597.
286. Id. at 602.
287. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
288. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
289. 842 S.W.2d at 588.
290. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
291. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
292. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
293. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
294. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
295. Bailey, supra note 46, at 779.
296. See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 42, at 229.
297. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
298. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
299. See Kerekes, supra note 29, at 220 (arguing this point).
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explicitly spoke of "the decedent's 'fundamental interest' in procrea-
tion."3
00
Standing alone, of course, a decedent's singular intent to sire
a child posthumously cannot be an exercise of the fundamental
right to procreate. When the decedent's partner fulfills this intent
by actually conceiving the child, however, the law should view this
as an attempt by both the decedent and his partner to exercise their
constitutionally protected right to create a family. 3 1 Accordingly,
the law should recognize the resulting child as the legal child of
that union. To do otherwise requires a semantic distinction-that
the child is a child of no father-which is illogical given that the
child is indisputably the genetic offspring of the deceased father
who demonstrated his intent to conceive the child.30 2
Regardless of whether the fundamental right to procreate
encompasses posthumous conception to the extent that it gives the
father a right to determine paternity,30 3 the existence of a general
right to procreate establishes the constitutionally inscribed impor-
tance of any decision "whether to bear or beget a child."30 4 This
should prompt states and courts to view the rights of posthumous
children generously in this light and to allow them to establish a
legal parent-child relationship. Indeed, this relationship is so im-
portant that some courts have held that a child has a "constitution-
ally protected interest in an accurate determination of paternity. °30 5
C. Constitutional Protections of Illegitimate Children
The traditional marriage vows that are intended to endure
"until death do us part" help set the framework for establishing the
rights of the posthumous child. Because the death of a spouse ter-
300. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (ordered not published).
301. But see Kristin L. Antall, Note, Who Is My Mother?: Why States Should Ban Posthumous
Reproduction by Women, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 203 (1999) (arguing that the potential negative re-
sults of women conceiving posthumously, as opposed to men, should prompt states to ban the
practice by women).
302. As one commentator has argued regarding posthumous conception, "[I]f the decision to
bear a child is a constitutionally protected choice, then it is logical to assume that the manner in
which that child is conceived is also a constitutionally protected decision, whether the child is
conceived through traditional coital means or by utilizing an artificial method of conception."
Kerekes, supra note 29, at 227.
303. See Gibbons, supra note 25, at 202-04 (arguing the fundamental right to procreate does
not include the right to determine paternity).
304. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
305. State ex rel. Henderson v. Woods, 865 P.2d 33, 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); see also
McMichael v. Fox, 937 P.2d 1075, 1082 (Wash. 1997) ("A child has a constitutional right to a
swift and accurate determination of paternity.").
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minates the marital relationship, children born of posthumous con-
ception are born outside of their parents' marriage covenant. Con-
sequently, posthumous children are viewed as illegitimate, 30 6 and
are thus properly brought within the scope of the Court's jurispru-
dence dealing with nonmarital children.
307
The "deeply rooted"308 importance of the family that has long
protected it against unacceptable governmental intrusions has not
provided the same level of inclusion for nonmarital children.
30 9 So-
ciety and the law have historically denied nonmarital children the
same protections extended to marital children, deeming the ille-
gitimate child to be filius nullius, the child of no one.310 The Su-
preme Court, however, has increasingly minimized the common
law's discriminatory treatment of nonmarital children and accorded
them greater constitutional protections. In 1968, the Court decided
two companion cases 311 that mark the initial development of the
modern view of the nonmarital child. 312 The primary of these two
cases, Levy v. Louisiana,31 3 rejected the common law conception of
nonmarital children and declared that "illegitimate children are not
'nonpersons.' They are humans, live, and have their being. They are
clearly 'persons' within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
31 4
306. Bailey, supra note 46, at 784.
307. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266-67 (Mass. 2002) ("Because death
ends a marriage, posthumously conceived children are always nonmarital children." (citations
omitted)).
308. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
309. Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1311-12 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1988) ("Historically,
both the English common law and society itself perceived illegitimate children to be a disgrace, a
stigma, and labeled this class with the title 'bastards.' Through no fault of his own, the bastard
was a social outcast. The bastard was a product of an illicit, immoral, and promiscuous relation-
ship. Because the child was not conceived within the legal constraints of marriage, the child
could not enjoy legal rights, liberties, and benefits of a child who was in fact conceived within the
bond of marriage. The right of an illegitimate child to inherit was nonexistent.... This status
continued in the common law and was eventually carried over to the United States.").
310. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 459 ("[H]e cannot be heir to any one, neither
can he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being nullius filius .... "), cited in Charles Nelson Le
Ray, Note, Implications of DNA Technology on Posthumous Paternity Determination: Deciding
the Facts When Daddy Can't Give His Opinion, 35 B.C. L. REV. 747, 750 n.25 (1994) (providing
an excellent discussion of illegitimacy and filiation issues).
311. See Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 74 (1968) ("We granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari [in this case] in order to hear the case along with Levy v. Louisi-
ana." (citations omitted)).
312. Brashier, supra note 37, at 105.
313. 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona, 391 U.S. at 76 (holding, in the companion case to Levy, that
the mother of an illegitimate child was denied equal protection when the state refused to grant
her relief in a wrongful death action merely because her "child, wrongfully killed, was born to her
out of wedlock").
314. Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.
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Applying rational basis scrutiny,315 the Court overturned a
Louisiana district court's and the Louisiana Court of Appeal's in-
terpretation of a Louisiana statute that allowed only legitimate
children to bring a cause of action for the wrongful death of a par-
ent, which denied the same cause of action to illegitimate chil-
dren.316 While noting that the legislature has "broad power" and
"great latitude" to make classifications for the purpose of "social
and economic legislation, '" 317 the Court stated that it has "been ex-
tremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights and ha[s] not
hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it
had history and tradition on its side. ' 318 The Court held that be-
cause the "rights asserted [in Levy] involve the intimate, familial
relationship between a child and his own mother, ' 319 and because
"[1]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of
the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother,"320 the classification
relied on by the lower courts was "invidious discrimination. '321 The
Court asked rhetorically, "Why should the illegitimate child be de-
nied rights merely because of his birth out of wedlock? He certainly
is subject to all the responsibilities of a citizen .... How under our
constitutional regime can he be denied correlative rights which
other citizens enjoy?"322
The Court in Labine v. Vincent,323 decided three years later,
retreated somewhat from Levy and gave greater weight to legisla-
tive prerogative. The Court upheld a Louisiana statute against an
equal protection challenge that denied the right of intestate inheri-
tance to a nonmarital child, even when the father had openly ac-
knowledged the child before a state agency. 324 The Court stated that
its prior decisions did not support the argument that "a State can
never treat an illegitimate child differently from legitimate off-
spring. '325 The Court further stated that the statute at issue merely
reflected the policy choices of the state legislature, which were
"within the power of the State to make."326 The Court recognized
315. Id. at 71; see also infra note 333 (describing types of judicial scrutiny).
316. Levy, 391 U.S. at 69, 72.
317. Id. at 71.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 72.
321. Id. at 71.
322. Id.
323. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
324. Id. at 533.
325. Id. at 536.
326. Id. at 537.
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that the power to enact laws to "strengthen family life" and "regu-
late the disposition of property" was "committed by the Constitution
... to the legislature. 3 27 The Court reasoned that the statute was
acceptable because it did not "create[ ] an insurmountable barrier
to this illegitimate child. There is not the slightest suggestion in
this case that Louisiana has barred this illegitimate child from in-
heriting from her father[,] ... had he bothered to follow the simple
formalities of executing a will."
328
Over the next six years, the Court decided several additional
cases329 involving "alleged discrimination on the basis of illegiti-
macy,"330 increasingly moving away from the high degree of judicial
deference shown to the legislature in Labine.331 These cases estab-
lished that the Court would apply a heightened level of scrutiny,
332
later recognized as intermediate scrutiny, 333 to statutory classifica-
tions based on illegitimacy. 334 Therefore, in order for a statutory
327. Id. at 538.
328. Id. at 539.
329. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974);
New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Beaty v. Weinberger,
478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), summarily affd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 1226 (D. Md.), summarily affld, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp.
588 (D. Conn.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
330. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 n.ll (1977).
331. See, e.g., id. at 767-68 n.12 (Powell, J.) ("Labine v. Vincent... is difficult to place in the
pattern of this Court's equal protection decisions, and subsequent cases have limited its force as
a precedent. In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co ... we found in Labine a recognition that judicial
deference is appropriate when the challenged statute involves the 'substantial state interest in
providing for the stability of... land titles and in the prompt and definitive determination of the
valid ownership of property left by decedents'.... We reaffirm that view, but there is a point
beyond which such deference cannot justify discrimination. Although the proposition is self-
evident, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), demonstrates that state statutes involving the disposi-
tion of property at death are not immunized from equal protection scrutiny." (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)).
332. Weber, 406 U.S. at 172 ("Though the latitude given state economic and social regulation
is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fundamental
personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scrutiny.").
333. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988):
In considering whether state legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, we apply different levels of scrutiny to different
types of classifications. At a minimum, a statutory classification must be ra-
tionally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Classifications based on
race or national origin and classifications affecting fundamental rights are
given the most exacting scrutiny. Between these extremes of rational basis re-
view and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally
has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.
(internal citations omitted).
334. See, e.g., Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767.
As we recognized in Lucas, illegitimacy is analogous in many respects to the
personal characteristics that have been held to be suspect when used as the ba-
sis of statutory differentiations. We nevertheless concluded that the analogy
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classification based on legitimacy of birth to satisfy equal protection
scrutiny, it must be "substantially related to an important govern-
mental objective. ' 3 5 The Court's subsequent cases shed light on
how this level of scrutiny is applied and what is required for a gov-
ernment objective to be sufficiently important to justify "discrimi-
natory classifications based on ... illegitimacy." 336
In Trimble v. Gordon, decided in 1977, the Court completed
its retreat from Labine.337 Trimble involved an Illinois statute that
allowed nonmarital children to inherit by intestate succession only
from their mothers, but allowed legitimate children to inherit from
both their mothers and their fathers. 338 The Court's central concern
in analyzing the statute focused on whether it "broadly discrimi-
nate[d] between legitimates and illegitimates. ' '339 The Court ac-
knowledged the special competence of the legislature in setting the
proper legal framework for the orderly disposition of property at
death, 340 but noted that courts play an important role when the leg-
islative scheme infringes upon a constitutional right.341 When such
rights are implicated, the statute should be scrutinized under a
standard that is not "toothless" 342 to determine whether it is "care-
fully tuned to alternative considerations." 343 Applying this stan-
dard, the Court invalidated the statute, finding that Illinois had
failed to consider a scheme falling between a complete ban on il-
legitimates inheriting from their fathers and an individual case-by-
case determination. 344 The Court noted that "[d]ifficulties of proving
paternity in some situations do not justify the total statutory disin-
heritance of illegitimate children whose fathers die intestate. ' 345
was not sufficient to require 'our most exacting scrutiny.' Despite the conclu-
sion that classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a 'realm of less than strict-
est scrutiny,' Lucas also establishes that the scrutiny 'is not a toothless one,' a
proposition clearly demonstrated by our previous decisions in this area.
Id.
335. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
336. Id.
337. 430 U.S. 762, 776 n.17 (1977) ("To the extent that our analysis in this case differs from
that in Labine the more recent analysis controls.").
338. Id. at 763.
339. Id. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)).
340. Id. at 771.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 767 (quoting Mathews, 427 U.S. at 510).
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The Court then rejected the "insurmountable barrier" analy-
sis applied in Labine,346 stating that the existence of any hypotheti-
cal alternative to intestate succession the parents could have taken
to provide for the child is irrelevant as to whether the statutory dif-
ferentiation on the basis of legitimacy violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 347 This analysis is important in light of the USCACA's as-
sertion that parents can "explicitly provide for such children in
their wills, ' 348 because such an option does not cure the complete
exclusion of posthumous children from establishing a legal relation-
ship with their deceased parent.349 A year later, the Court in Lalli
v. Lalli upheld a New York statute that permitted an illegitimate
child to inherit by intestate succession from his father only if he
had obtained a court order of filiation during the father's lifetime.
350
The Court held that the statute's court-ordered filiation require-
ment was unconstitutional because it was substantially related to
the government's important interest in the orderly disposition of
property at death. 351 The Court asserted that in light of the "pecu-
liar problems of proof' that are involved in determining paternity
when the father is not part of a family unit,35 2 the filiation require-
ment helped substantially to prevent spurious claims or fraudulent
assertions of paternity.
353
In distinguishing Lalli from Trimble, the Court provided im-
portant guidance for determining the legal status of posthumous
children. The Court noted that the Illinois statute in Trimble was
unconstitutional because it provided a "total statutory disinheri-
tance" of illegitimate children who were not subsequently legiti-
mated by the marriage of their parents. 354 The New York statute,
conversely, barred inheritance only where there had been no pater-
nity determination during the father's lifetime. 355 The Court noted
that this "is not a requirement that inevitably disqualifies an un-
necessarily large number of children born out of wedlock." 356 By
346. See 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1971); see also supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
347. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 774.
348. USCACA, supra note 56, at § 4(b) cmt., at 372.
349. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 773 (noting that the Court's distinction of Labine in Weber was
'"based in part on the fact that no such alternatives existed, as state law prevented the acknowl-
edgement of the children involved").
350. 439 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1978) (plurality opinion).
351. Id. at 275-76.
352. Id. at 268-69.
353. Id. at 271-72.





contrast, the statutory responses to posthumous conception not only
disqualify a large number of posthumous children from filiating
with their deceased parent, but they also deny this opportunity to
all such children. 357 Furthermore, posthumous conception does not
present the problems of proving paternity that were sometimes pre-
sent in traditional illegitimate child cases, 358 because paternity can
be established indisputably at the time that the gamete material is
preserved. 359 Moreover, current DNA tests are sufficiently accurate
to render such a concern insignificant. 36 0 In sum, because posthu-
mous children have no possibility of filiating during their father's
lifetime, they deserve special consideration and should not be vis-
ited with the long-rejected treatment the law historically extended
to illegitimate children.
361
Under equal protection analysis, a state cannot discriminate
against similarly situated persons.362 Nonmarital children and
nonmarital posthumous children are similarly situated as they are
both indisputably the genetic offspring of the parent, differing only
in the timing and circumstances of their birth.363 Accordingly,
granting nonmarital children the opportunity to establish a legal
relationship with their genetic parents while simultaneously deny-
ing that opportunity to nonmarital posthumous children is inconsis-
tent with equal protection principles. 364 The Court provided support
for this argument in Clark v. Jeter, in which it held that a Pennsyl-
vania statute of limitations for filing paternity actions violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it allowed a longer statute of limi-
tations in analogous situations. 36 5 The Court found that Pennsyl-
357. But see supra Part II.A.3.b (discussing Virginia's approach).
358. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 271-72.
359. But see supra note 345 and accompanying text.
360. See Le Ray, supra note 310, at 747-48; see also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988);
Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1311 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1988) (taking judicial notice that,
with the accuracy of DNA tests, "the problems of proof inherent to an action in which paternity is
alleged should no longer deprive an illegitimate child of proving his paternity").
361. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
362. See Kerekes, supra note 29, at 227-28.
363. See supra note 152 and accompanying text; see also Shah, supra note 48, at 569 (arguing
that treating posthumous children differently from children born through normal reproduction is
"tantamount to treating children who are born by Cesarean section differently from those who
are born vaginally").
364. See Kerekes, supra note 29, at 227-28 (arguing same point); see also note 149 and ac-
companying text.
365. 486 U.S. 456, 464 (1988); see also Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 97 (1982) (holding
that the time permitted to bring a filiation claim "must be sufficiently long to permit those who
normally have an interest in such children to bring an action on their behalf despite the difficult
personal, family, and financial circumstances that often surround the birth of a child outside of
wedlock").
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vania's six-year statute of limitations for filing a paternity claim
was not substantially related to the state's asserted purpose of pre-
venting stale or fraudulent claims because, for example, claims to
obtain child support were allowed until the children reached the
age of eighteen.
66
The Court then outlined the. proper framework for evaluating
equal protection challenges to such time limitations. First, the
statute of limitations must provide a reasonable opportunity to as-
sert a claim.3 67 Second, any time limitation must be substantially
related to the state's interest.368 Applying this standard to posthu-
mous conception, all of the current statutory responses to the post-
humous child prove inadequate. 369 While each reflects the impor-
tant state interest in the orderly disposition of property at death,
which is the province of the state legislature, 370 none provides a
reasonable opportunity for a posthumous child to bring a filiation
action. Instead, they impose a complete ban, denying posthumous
children any possibility of filiating,371 despite the fact that posthu-
mous children differ from other nonmarital children only in the tim-
ing and circumstances of their births.372 The viability of these stat-
utes is dubious in light of the Court's equal protection analysis in
the nonmarital children cases. 373 According to the drafters of the
USCACA, the purpose of denying posthumous children the oppor-
tunity to establish a legal relationship with their deceased parent is
to avoid the problems that would exist if a posthumous child had a
legal basis to make a claim on the parent's estate. 374 This is an
impermissibly one-sided approach, however, as it considers only the
government's interest and does not balance that interest with the
rights of the child. Moreover, it pays no heed to the Trimble Court's
directive that any legislative constraint placed on nonmarital chil-
dren be "carefully tuned to alternative considerations. '375 The court
in Kolacy also acknowledged the need for such balancing that care-
366. Clark, 486 U.S. at 463-64.
367. Id. at 462 (citing Mills, 456 U.S. at 99-100).
368. Id.
369. See supra Parts II.A.2, 3.
370. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978) ("We have long recognized that [the disposition of
property at death] is an area with which the States have an interest of considerable magni-
tude."); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977) ("The orderly disposition of property
at death ... is a matter particularly within the competence of the individual states.").
371. See supra Part II.A.3.
372. See supra notes 151-52, 362-64.
373. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771.
374. USCACA, supra note 56, § 4(b) cmt., at 372.
375. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772.
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fully considers the rights of the child, stating that "we should rou-
tinely grant the child the legal status of being an heir of the dece-
dent, unless doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other
persons or would cause serious problems in terms of the orderly
administration of estates. '376 The Woodward court specifically re-
quired such balancing as well.
377
V. A CONSTITUTIONALLY GROUNDED FRAMEWORK
Three overriding principles can be derived from these impor-
tant areas of constitutional jurisprudence that form the basis of a
framework for analyzing posthumous conception. First, states must
protect the parent-child relationship. Second, any determination of
the rights of posthumous children must accommodate the state's
important interest in the administration of estates. Third, states
need to adopt measures that protect the welfare of posthumous
children. This framework can guide policymakers in adopting spe-
cific measures to resolve the issues raised by posthumous concep-
tion in ways that are consistent with the constitutional protections
that the Supreme Court has affirmed for the family.
A. Protecting the Parent-Child Relationship
The right of privacy of family and procreation is a crucial fix-
ture in constitutional law. 378 The focus of this privacy is on the "pro-
tected intimate relationship" and extends beyond any particular
place as "required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved."
379
One of the most important intimate relationships is between parent
and child.380 This parent-child relationship is at the very heart of
376. 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
377. 760 N.E.2d 257, 265-66 (Mass. 2002) (noting that the "best interests" of posthumous
conceived children "must be balanced against other important State interests"); see also supra
note 197 (discussing Woodward).
378. See supra Parts IV.A, B.
379. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 423 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973) ("[T]he constitutionally pro-
tected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just con-
cerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such protected pri-
vacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safe-
guard the right to intimacy involved.").
380. "To be sure, [Meyer and Pierce] did not expressly consider the family relationship pre-
sented here. They were immediately concerned with freedom of choice with respect to childbear-
ing .... or with the rights of parents to the custody and companionship of their own children ...
or with traditional parental authority in matters in child rearing and education.... But unless
we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been
accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, we cannot avoid apply-
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the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the family38 1 and does not
disappear in the context of posthumous conception. The fact that
the father is deceased does not extinguish the parental bond for a
posthumous child, a bond that will most assuredly be further nur-
tured by the mother as she relates her memories of the deceased
father to the child.38 2 Accordingly, it takes no leap of faith to argue
that the fundamental right to establish a family, so crucial in con-
stitutional law, at the very least informs a posthumous child's in-
terest in establishing a legal relationship with the parent with
whom he or she shares a genetic heritage.
38 3
States should honor and protect this parent-child relation-
ship in two principal ways. First, states should establish a formal
method for fathers to expressly demonstrate their intent to conceive
and claim a legal relationship with a posthumous child. This could
easily be accomplished at the time of preservation, as hopeful par-
ents could specify whether they would want their gametes to be
used posthumously to conceive a child and exactly by whom. 3
84
States could statutorily require sperm banks to stipulate such a
disclosure. 385 This has additional importance because an individual
also has a constitutional interest in not procreating and should be
allowed to prevent the use of his gametes for unauthorized posthu-
mous conception. 38 6 Second, in the absence of an express showing of
intent, posthumous children should have access to an alternative
method of establishing a legal relationship with their deceased par-
ents. Some people who clearly desire and intend to sire a child may
not anticipate their own death as a factor in the decision; therefore,
posthumous children should be allowed to demonstrate their fa-
ther's intent by some means other than an express showing.
38 7
ing the force and rationale of these precedents to the family choice involved in this case." Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-01 (1977).
381. See supra Part IV.A.
382. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 295-303 and accompanying text.
384. Courts have already recognized the right of a gamete provider to have dispositional con-
trol over his reproductive material. See supra Part II.B.1.
385. See Lorio, supra note 195, at 51 (suggesting that at the time of preservation the prospec-
tive parent should provide "specific written indication of intent").
386. Schiff, supra note 18, at 943 ("Although a person who has a child posthumously obvi-
ously will have no rearing responsibilities and, consequently, will not have any ongoing emo-
tional or social relationship with the child, the fact that a person will not be present to experi-
ence the manifold emotions and events associated with parenthood does not mean that he or she
has no interest in preventing procreation. To foist parenthood upon an individual after death
knowing that this contravenes the deceased's explicit wishes infringes upon the autonomy of the
pre-mortem individual, by depriving him or her of control over a highly significant interest.").
387. The Kolacy court acknowledged the importance of this possibility, noting that William
Kolacy "by his intentional conduct created the possibility of having long-delayed after born chil-
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States could prescribe specific factors that would satisfactorily indi-
cate a person's intent to conceive a child posthumously, clearing the
way for a posthumous child to claim a legal relationship with the
deceased parent. For example, letters, oral statements, or other
preparations typically taken by hopeful parents could indicate a
person's intention to beget a child, even if posthumously.
388
B. Protecting Important State Interests
States have an important interest in the orderly administra-
tion of estates. This has been the primary justification for denying
posthumous children the right to establish a legal relationship with
a deceased parent. 38 9 The state's interest in estate administration,
however, must yield when it unduly infringes upon the well-
established constitutional status of the family, 390 and particularly
upon the liberty interest of the child to be a part of that family. 391
Orderly estate administration is not a sufficient justification to
deny posthumous children their rightful place in the family when
the "Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and effi-
ciency."3
92
This is not, however, a zero-sum proposition. States can
choose from a wide variety of procedures that appropriately balance
these seemingly competing interests. For example, states could es-
tablish a reasonable statute of limitations, 393 during which the po-
dren." 753 A.2d 1257, 1263-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). The court also accepted as true
Mariantonia's statement that "her husband unequivocally expressed his desire that she use his
stored sperm after his death to bear his children." Id. at 1263.
388. The Woodward court seemingly gave approval of a list of items the administrative law
judge, who first heard the case, would have considered to determine the decedent's intent to
conceive a child posthumously, including "additional declarations or written statements from the
decedent's family, [the wife's] family, financial records or records from the fertility institute that
demonstrate acknowledgement [of the children] made by [the husband]." 760 N.E.2d 257, 271
(Mass. 2002).
389. See supra Part III.A.
390. As the Supreme Court has affirmed, "[A] law cannot stand in light of the familiar prin-
ciple, so often applied by this Court, that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unneces-
sarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (internal quotation marks omitted).
391. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
392. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) ("Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect
the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and effi-
cacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.").
393. See supra notes 364-68 and accompanying text; see also Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle
in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Repro-
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tential mother could provide notice of her intent to bear a posthu-
mous child with the deceased father's sperm. This would provide
notice to the deceased father's estate to anticipate the birth of a
posthumous child and act accordingly. 394 Distribution of the estate's
assets could be postponed for the limitation period or until the birth
of the posthumous child.395 Alternatively, the estate's distribution
could allow a pro rata share to be reserved for the prospective post-
humous child. If the mother eventually decides to forgo conceiving
the child or if for some other reason the child is not born, the estate
could then redistribute the reserved share to the remaining heirs
according to their respective entitlements. The Uniform Probate
Code already contains a four-year limitation period for claims
against a decedent's estate, thus such an approach is not unimagin-
able or unworkable. 396 A number of commentators have proposed
additional procedures designed to balance the needs for estate ad-
ministration and the rights of posthumous children. 397 The Kolacy
court likewise suggested a possible means of balancing the compet-
ing interests of efficient estate administration and posthumous
children. 39
8
ductive Technology, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 335, 365 (1994) (suggesting the possibility that a statute of
limitations could resolve this problem).
394. But see Brashier, supra note 37, at 214 & n.410 (noting that the disadvantage of solu-
tions such as a statute of limitations "is their potential for tremendously complicating and delay-
ing estate administration" and arguing that the best solution to inheritance issues for posthu-
mous children is for parents to provide for the child through a will).
395. Other writers have suggested similar approaches as a sensible solution to these prob-
lems. See, e.g., Shah, supra note 48, at 569-70 (suggesting intestacy laws could be modified to
allow a prospective parent to designate how the estate is to be distributed specifically regarding
a future posthumous child and state an amount that could be reserved for that child and for how
long).
396. See Djalleta, supra note 393, at 368-69 (discussing the Uniform Probate Code and sug-
gesting possible amendments that would specifically address the status of posthumous children);
see also Mika & Hurst, supra note 46, at 1018-19.
397. See Garside, supra note 29, at 731-32 (proposing a public registry in which the potential
mother and potential father can provide notice of intent, through a notarized act, to engage in
posthumous conception, putting interested third parties on notice, or requiring by clear and
convincing evidence that the deceased parent intended for the child to be posthumously con-
ceived within two years of his death and that this intent was realized); Kerekes, supra note 29,
at 242-43, 248-49 (suggesting the possibility, though imperfect, of expanding the definition of a
pretermitted heir to include posthumous children or, alternatively, directing by statute proce-
dures for reserving a portion of an estate for a potential posthumous child and for distributing
the estate assets in the event of an actual posthumous child).
398. 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) ("Even in situations where compet-
ing interests such as other children born during the lifetime of the decedent are in existence at
the time of his death, it might be possible to accommodate those interests with the interests of
after born children. For example, by statutory provision or decisional rule, payments made in the
course of routine estate administration before the advent of after born children could be treated
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Put simply, depriving posthumous children of the opportu-
nity to establish a legal relationship with their deceased parents
just to avoid complications with estate administrations is an inade-
quate response to this important issue. State legislatures, with
their collective resources, experience, and wisdom, could develop
any number of methods for achieving a balance between the inter-
ests of the state and the interests of the posthumous child. For, if
the family is "deeply rooted in America's history and tradition" and
is the social institution through which "we inculcate and pass down
many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural, ' 399 then cer-
tainly the child's right to establish legal membership within that
family is more important than mere administrative convenience.
C. Protecting the Welfare of the Posthumous Child
Resolving posthumous children's capacity to claim a legal re-
lationship with their deceased parents clears the way for taking
further measures to protect the welfare of the posthumous child. As
the Kolacy and Woodward courts recognized, states have an impor-
tant policy interest in ensuring that children are amply provided
for.40 0 This is also an important principle underlying the Supreme
Court's decisions regarding illegitimate children.40 1 Granting post-
humous children intestate inheritance rights is one method of pro-
viding for the physical needs of children left without a parent's
support.40 2 Granting survivor's benefits to these children is another
option.40
3
Posthumous children face the same financial and other bur-
dens that any child would face upon losing a parent.40 4 If posthu-
mous children are denied inheritance and survivor's benefits, how-
ever, they could face even greater financial burdens because other
children would be entitled to such benefits. Denying posthumous
children the very benefits that are intended to help support chil-
dren upon losing a parent could also raise the possibility that post-
as vested and left undisturbed, while distributions made following the birth of after born chil-
dren could be made to both categories of children.").
399. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
400. Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 265-66 (Mass. 2002); Kolacy, 753
A.2d at 1262.
401. See supra Part IV.C.
402. Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1262 (noting that the New Jersey legislature had "manifested a
general intent that the children of a decedent should be amply provided for with respect to prop-
erty passing from him or through him as a result of death").
403. See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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humous children might face an increased potential of dependence
upon public assistance. 4 5 To resolve this predicament, states
should enact legislation that extends inheritance and survivor's
benefits to posthumous children. Because estate assets and survi-
vor's benefits are earned and accrued by the parent during life,
406
this would allow the parents an opportunity to support their own
children, which undoubtedly would be their desire. 40 7 This would
consequently reduce the financial burdens faced by posthumous
children and the potential need for society to provide for such chil-
dren.408 Furthermore, because inheritance rights evolve over time,
recognizing posthumous children as the legal heirs of the deceased
father would allow them to gain intestate inheritance rights from
their father's family and relatives, thereby enhancing their finan-
cial support.40 9 Moreover, this would provide the additional advan-
tage of allowing the father's family to acquire custody rights in the
event of the mother's death. Thus, if the mother dies, the father's
parents could readily step in to take care of the child, if needed,
since they would already be recognized as the posthumous child's
legal grandparents.
405. See Shah, supra note 48, at 569 (focusing on how not allowing posthumous children to
inherit by intestate succession would take the responsibility of providing for children from their
parents and place the burden on taxpayers).
406. Although Shah recognized the increased potential of posthumous children to create a fi-
nancial burden on society, she suggested that the intestate laws should be changed to allow
parents to provide for posthumous children and argued that Social Security should not be paid to
posthumous children, claiming that it would otherwise become comparable to a "government
subsidy" like welfare. Id. at 570. This argument, however, fails to recognize the deceased parent's
contributions to social security made during life for this very purpose. Naturally born children
are entitled to Social Security survivor's benefits; thus, arguing that posthumous children are
not likewise entitled to this source of support is invalid because posthumous children should be
no different from naturally born children for equal protection purposes. See supra note 372; see
also supra note 136 and accompanying text (describing Lauren Woodward's efforts to obtain
Social Security survivor's benefits for her posthumously conceived children).
407. The father in life will have a significant interest in the future well-being of the child.
"For the donor [father], 'it is a great comfort and satisfaction to know during life that, even after
death, those whom one cares about can be provided for and may be able to enjoy better lives
because of the inheritance that can be left to them.'" Djalleta, supra note 393, at 364 (quoting E.
HALBACH, DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 5 (E. Halbach ed., 1977)); see also supra notes
186-89 and accompanying text.
408. Shah, supra note 48, at 569; see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
409. In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (noting that
the children's status as legal heirs "could also be significant in determining their rights under
the wills of their father's relatives").
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This framework has two important features. First, it re-
spects the constitutional safeguards the Supreme Court has recog-
nized for the family and parental liberties. The Court has clearly
established that the family enjoys constitutional status 410 and that
the right to conceive children is constitutionally protected. 411 This
framework recognizes and recommends that these constitutional
protections, at the very least, animate posthumous children's inter-
ests in establishing a legal relationship with their deceased par-
ents. Second, this framework allows flexibility to adopt a wide
range of measures to resolve the competing policy interests of the
state and the rights of posthumous children. By recognizing the
outer perimeter of important constitutional principles in the area of
family and procreation, states can adopt measures to balance their
particular and diverse policy concerns while remaining consistent
with those principles.
VI. CONCLUSION
As new technologies transform the nature of reproduction,
the law must continue to adapt to new realities. 412 Posthumous con-
ception is one of these new realities that promises to become more
prevalent. 413 A total denial of posthumous children's right to estab-
lish a legal relationship with their deceased parents is an inade-
quate response to this new reality.414 The posthumous child repre-
sents the desire of parents-made possible by technology-to create
a family in the only way possible in their individual circum-
410. See supra Part IV.A.
411. See supra Part IV.B.
412. The Woodward court clearly recognized this point:
As these technologies advance, the number of children they produce will con-
tinue to multiply. So, too, will the complex moral, legal, social, and ethical
questions that surround their birth. The questions present in this case cry out
for lengthy, careful examination outside the adversary process, which can only
address the specific circumstances of each controversy that presents itself. They
demand a comprehensive response reflecting the considered will of the people.
760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002).
413. Kerekes, supra note 29, at 227 ("It is highly unlikely that the problem [of posthumous
children] will simply go away in light of the burgeoning number of alternative methods of as-
sisted conception.").
414. The admonition of the Kolacy court that granted Amanda and Elyse's petition to gain
legal recognition as William's children is powerfully relevant in this regard: "[O]nce a child has
come into existence, she is a full-fledged human being and is entitled to all of the love, respect,
dignity and legal protection which that status requires. It seems to me that a fundamental policy
of the law should be to enhance and enlarge the rights of each human being to the maximum
extent possible, consistent with the duty not to intrude unfairly upon the interests of other per-
sons." Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1263.
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stances. 415 The right of privacy and the paramount importance of
the family should be interpreted as being broad enough to, if not
encompass, then certainly to inform the procreative choices of these
hopeful parents. Furthermore, denying posthumous children the
opportunity to establish a legal relationship with their deceased
parents based solely on the circumstances and timing of their birth
is inconsistent with the principles of equal protection. 416 The practi-
cal realities of denying posthumous children in this way create legal
and financial burdens that are unrelated to the children's a ctions.417
As the Trimble Court noted, "[I]mposing disabilities on the illegiti-
mate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibil-
ity. '418 The same is equally true for posthumous children. 419 A hope-
ful parent's desire to bear a child is one of society's most cherished
values 420 and has received the highest constitutional protections. 421
Therefore, as courts and legislatures are increasingly called upon to
415.
[Tihe Legislature has in great measure affirmatively supported the assistive
reproductive technologies that are the only means by which these children can
come into being. We do not impute to the Legislature the inherently irrational
conclusion that assistive reproductive technologies are to be encouraged while a
class of children who are the fruit of that technology are to have fewer rights
and protections than other children.
Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265.
416. See supra Part IV.C.
417. Cf. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977) ("[W]e have expressly considered and re-
jected the argument that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by
imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships.").
418. Id. at 769-70; see also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 n.6 (1968) (using the words of
Shakespeare from KING LEAR act I, sc. 2, to express the impropriety of placing burdens on a child
because of the circumstances of birth: "Why bastard, wherefore base? When my dimensions are
as well compact, My mind as generous, and my shape as true, As honest madam's issue? Why
brand they us With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base?" (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
419. "Denying [posthumous] children legal rights of inheritance based on the theory that
such denial would deter people from posthumously reproducing is the moral equivalent of deny-
ing illegitimate children inheritance rights in order to deter people from having children out of
wedlock." Lorio, supra note 195, at 45; see also Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854-55 n.5 (1986)
("It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or na-
tional origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate
individual, and it bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to
society. The Court recognized in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), that
visiting condemnation upon the child in order to express society's disapproval of the parents'
liaisons 'is illogical .... Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the ille-
gitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent.' " (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976)).
420. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The right to have offspring is "one of
the basic civil rights of man." Id.
421. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); see also supra Part
IV.B.
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determine the status of children born through posthumous concep-
tion, they should approach their task with this perspective in mind.
Christopher A. Scharman*
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